Alienated Belief

Abstract

This paper argues that it is possible to knowingly believe something while judging that one ought not to believe it and (so) viewing the belief as manifesting a sort of failure. I offer examples showing that such ‘alienated belief’ has several potential sources. I contrast alienated belief with self‐deception, incontinent (or akratic) belief and half‐belief. I argue that the possibility of alienated belief is compatible with the so‐called ‘transparency’ of first‐person reflection on belief, and that the descriptive and expressive difficulties it involves stem from well‐understood sources. I conclude by speculating that endorsed belief is in important respects like intentional action. Reflection on the possibility of alienated belief may thus help us to see one respect in which an agent can be responsible for her attitudes.

The Normativity of Automaticity

“…What do trembling Skywalkers and aversive racists really believe? In cases of mismatch, one might adopt: (a) a truth‐taking view, which attributes beliefs on the basis of agents' reflective judgments and avowals (Gendler; Zimmerman, ); (b) an action‐guiding view, which attributes beliefs on the basis of agents' spontaneous actions and emotions (Hunter, ); (c) a context‐relative view, which takes both judgment and action to be relevant to belief attribution, and attributes to agents beliefs that vary wildly across contexts (Rowbottom, ); (d) a contradictory view, which takes both judgment and action to be independently sufficient for belief attribution, and attributes to agents contradictory beliefs (Egan, ; Gertler, ; Huddleston, ; Huebner, ; Muller and Bashour, ); or (e) an indeterminacy view, which takes neither judgment nor action to be independently sufficient, and attributes to agents no determinate belief at all, but just some ‘in‐between’ state (Elga, ; Schwitzgebel, )…”

Unendorsed Beliefs

“…The belief is one that is not fully ‘up to her’. This feature of her case has also been indicated as a feature of alienated beliefs (see Moran ; Hunter ). However, Clairk does acknowledge that her unendorsed belief is one of her own beliefs.…”

“…Certain beliefs remain in our psychology and keep guiding our actions despite our explicit rejection of the belief's content (Cassam ; Gertler ; Frankish ). Sometimes, beliefs become resistant to evaluative reasons and, thus, our rational agential control over them fails (Moran ; Bortolotti ; Hunter ). Finally, certain beliefs are very hard to know from the first‐person perspective (Moran ; Cassam ).…”

Dissonance and Irrationality: A Criticism of The In‐Between Account of Dissonance Cases

“…He analyses the proposals advanced by Tamar Gendler () and by Aaron Zimmerman (), both representing the pro‐judgment view. Schwitzgebel classifies David Hunter () as holding the anti‐judgment view and also evaluates his particular approach. However, due to the objective of this article, I will not discuss those positions in detail.…”

“…Evidence of this fact is that in principle we could attribute a false belief to ourselves (see Hunter, ).…”