All the (Many, Many) Things We Know: Extended Knowledge*

Abstract

In this paper we explore the potential bearing of the extended mind thesisthe thesis that the mind extends into the world-on epistemology. We do three things. First, we argue that the combination of the extended mind thesis and reliabilism about knowledge entails that ordinary subjects can easily come to enjoy various forms of restricted omniscience. Second, we discuss the conceptual foundations of the extended mind and knowledge debate. We suggest that the theses of extended mind and extended knowledge lead to a bifurcation with respect to the concepts of belief and knowledge. We suggest that this conceptual bifurcation supports a form of pluralism about these concepts. Third, we discuss whether something similar can be said at the metaphysical level.

Extended Cognition and the Internet

“…In particular, he anticipates 'an explosion of dispositional beliefs and knowledge that is caused by digital information resources such as Wikipedia or Google' (p. 355). Similar views are expressed by Bjerring and Pedersen (2014). They argue that the Web enables us to enjoy various forms of 'restricted epistemic omniscience', wherein we have more-or-less 'complete knowledge about a particular, fairly specific subject matter' (p. 25).…”

“…In general, the Internet has been seen to betoken a significant expansion in our epistemic capabilities (Ludwig 2015;Bjerring and Pedersen 2014); however, I have attempted to sound a note of caution here. While we might assume that Internet-extended cognition leads to an effective supersizing of our epistemic power and potential, things are not so straightforward when the epistemic status of the Internet-extended cognizer is evaluated with respect to virtue-theoretic epistemological theories, especially those that emphasize the role of cognitive ability in securing claims of positive epistemic standing (Greco 2007;.…”

“…It also serves to highlight some of the problems confronting claims about the epistemological significance of the Internet (Ludwig 2015;Bjerring and Pedersen 2014). Although it is perhaps natural to assume that Internet-extended cognizers will give rise to Internet-extended knowers, things look a lot more complicated when we attempt to situate claims of extended knowledge within the theoretical frameworks of contemporary epistemology.…”

“…a mental state whose realization base extends beyond the traditional organismic boundaries of the biological individual). This, I assume, is the sort of view that is countenanced by both Ludwig (2015) and Bjerring and Pedersen (2014) as part of their attempt to make the case for Internet-enabled forms of epistemic expansion.…”

“…This sort of reasoning forms the basis for a number of recent claims regarding the epistemic impact of the Internet (Ludwig 2015;Bjerring and Pedersen 2014). Ludwig (2015), for example, argues that in the wake of Internet-based forms of cognitive extension, we should anticipate a profound transformation of our doxastic potential.…”