Alliance Formation Among Perfectly Complementary Suppliers in a Price-Sensitive Assembly System

Yin, Shuya

doi:10.1287/msom.1090.0283

Cited by 77 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Huang and Ke [24] considered a pricing competition and cooperation problem in a two-echelon supply chain with one common manufacturer and duopoly retailers. Yin [25] formulated different supplier alliance models to determine wholesale pricing. Based on the newsvendor model, Krishnan and Winter [26] discussed the cooperation problem of the supply chain under a dynamic environment.…”

Section: Supply Chain Cooperation and Optimizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation Modes of Operations and Financing in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain

Yang

Chen

2018

Sustainability

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Abstract:With the significant increase of fossil energy consumption and the ever-worsening pollution of environment, low-carbon development becomes an inevitable choice. Carbon finance can help firms alleviate the finance pressure from carbon emission reduction. This research explores two financing methods, delay-in-payment and bank loan; and two cooperation decisions, carbon emission reduction cooperation and price cooperation. Four scenarios are considered: non-cooperation, partial-cooperation delay-in-payment, supply chain carbon finance (SCCF), and full-cooperation. We discuss how firms make their pricing and carbon emission reduction decisions under different cooperative levels and financing methods. For a manufacturer-dominated supply chain, the results show that SCCF will help the small and medium enterprise seek cooperation with the monopoly manufacturer, and improve supply chain's profit compared to green loan. What's more, SCCF pattern can effectively control the total carbon emission. In addition, we extend the model to consider the retailer-dominated case. The results show that SCCF pattern can help increase the emission reduction rate of the whole supply chain. From the perspective of emission reduction efficiency, it is better for the government to promote the SCCF mode in the retailer-dominated supply chain.

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Section: Supply Chain Cooperation and Optimizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation Modes of Operations and Financing in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain

Yang

Chen

2018

Sustainability

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“…For example, we show that there are infinitely many SPNEs whereas there is a unique SPNE in the lower advertisement revenue regime. [15] also concluded that the the push interaction is not socially optimal since the price quoted to the end-users never becomes 0. However, our analysis shows that in the high advertisement revenue regime, the payment that each end-user incurs becomes 0.…”

Section: E Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing for profit in internet of things

Ghosh

Sarkar

2015

2015 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)

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The economic model of the Internet of Things (IoT) consists of end users, advertisers and three different kinds of providers-IoT service provider (IoTSP), Wireless service provider (WSP) and cloud service provider (CSP). We investigate three different kinds of interactions among the providers. First, we consider that the IoTSP prices a bundled service to the end-users, and the WSP and CSP pay the IoTSP (push model). Next, we consider the model where the end-users independently pay the each provider (pull model). Finally, we consider a hybrid model of the above two where the IoTSP and WSP quote their prices to the end-users, but the CSP quotes its price to the IoTSP.We model different kinds of interaction among the providers as a combination of sequential and parallel non-cooperative games. We characterize and quantify the impact of the advertisement revenue on the equilibrium pricing strategy and payoff of providers, and corresponding demands of end users in each of the above interaction models. Our analysis reveals that the demand of end-users, and the payoffs of the providers are non decreasing functions of the advertisement revenue. For sufficiently high advertisement revenue, the IoTSP will offer its service free of cost in each interaction model. However, the payoffs of the providers, and the demand of end-users vary across different interaction models. Our analysis shows that the demand of end-users, and the payoff of the WSP are the highest in the pull (push, resp.) model in the low (high, resp.) advertisement revenue regime. The payoff of the IoTSP is always higher in the pull model irrespective of the advertisement revenue. The payoff of the CSP is the highest in the hybrid model in the low advertisement revenue regime. However, in the high advertisement revenue regime the payoff of the CSP in the hybrid model or in the push model can be higher depending on the equilibrium chosen in the push model.A part of this paper was presented in ISIT'15 [1]. The authors are with the Electrical and Systems Engg.

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“…Joint selling of complementary components has been studied recently in operations management; see, e.g., Granot and Yin (2008), Nagarajan and Bassok (2008), Sošić (2009), andYin (2010). However, these papers assume a monopolist supplier for each of these complementary components, which leads to a unique final product.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This stability concept is often interpreted as a necessary condition for network equilibrium and proves very useful in many applications such as social relationships, partnerships, and coauthorships (see, e.g., Jackson 2005, Ilkilic 2010). Pairwise stability has also been used in studying coalition formation games in operations management (see, e.g., Granot and Yin 2008, Nagarajan and Sošić 2008, Yin 2010, Fang and Cho 2014.…”

Section: Model Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Joint Selling of Complementary Components Under Brand and Retail Competition

Yin

2015

M&SOM

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Suppliers of complementary goods often package their items together when selling to downstream retailers. One motivation behind this behavior is to reduce double marginalization through coordinated pricing so that system efficiency is improved and individual members can also benefit. The objective of this paper is to understand how competition in supply chains would impact such joint selling partnerships among complementary suppliers. We first model competition at the supply level, which is generated from the existence of multiple partially substitutable brands (or suppliers) for a particular component. We then extend the analysis to a model that also involves retail competition caused by decentralization among retailers who assemble suppliers' components into final products and sell to customers. The analysis of a model with two complementary components, one of which has multiple brands, indicates that the supply-level competition discourages joint selling of complementary goods. That is, when competing brands become more alike (or substitutable), complementary suppliers act more independently in pricing and selling their items. However, retail competition leads to an opposite effect: Competition among retailers would actually encourage complementary suppliers to package their goods together and act jointly.

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Alliance Formation Among Perfectly Complementary Suppliers in a Price-Sensitive Assembly System

Cited by 77 publications

References 31 publications

Cooperation Modes of Operations and Financing in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain

Cooperation Modes of Operations and Financing in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain

Pricing for profit in internet of things

Joint Selling of Complementary Components Under Brand and Retail Competition

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