Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management

Schroeder, Paul W.

doi:10.1007/978-1-137-06138-6_10

Cited by 75 publications

(64 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Some scholars have argued that leaders may form alliances for reasons other than to enhance their security. For instance, more powerful states may offer security alliances to less powerful states in return for influence over the domestic and/or foreign policies of their weaker partners (for example , Schroeder 1976;and Morrow 1991). Less powerful states may agree to join a coalition to obtain economic or military aid.…”

Section: The Formation and Fulfillment Of Alliance Agreementsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties

Leeds¹

2003

Int Org

248

203

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Understanding the conditions under which state leaders are willing to honor alliance commitments in war will increase knowledge about the escalation and diffusion of conflict and about the propensity of states to fulfill agreements under anarchy. New data analysis provides evidence that alliance commitments are fulfilled about 75 percent of the time. But how can one understand the failure of alliance partners to act as promised in the remaining 25 percent of cases? Formal modelers have deduced that because of the costs associated with alliances, state leaders who form alliances are likely to fulfill them; those alliances that are formed should be fairly reliable. I argue, therefore, that one can best account for violations of alliance agreements either through an understanding of the factors that reduce the costs of violation or through changes that have occurred since the alliance was formed. Using detailed data on alliance commitments between 1816 and 1944, I find evidence commensurate with this argument. Changes in the power of states or in their policymaking processes are powerful predictors of the failure to honor past commitments; and nondemocratic states and major powers, sets of states that I argue suffer lower costs from reneging on agreements, are more likely to violate treaties.

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Section: The Formation and Fulfillment Of Alliance Agreementsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties

Leeds¹

2003

Int Org

248

203

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“…Several scholars have studied the function of alliances as conflict management institutions and also their effects on other cooperative interactions, especially international trade. Schroeder (1976) famously referred to alliances as "tools for management," claiming that more powerful states might be motivated to form alliances to "manage" the policies of other states. Similarly, and Pressman (2008) suggest that major powers may want to restrain the foreign policy actions of weaker powers through alliance constraints; these theories relate closely to the issue linkage arguments regarding asymmetric alliances discussed above.…”

Section: How Do Alliances Affect Relations Among Members?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Do States Sign Alliances?

Leeds

2015

Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences

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Despite the fact that policy-makers and scholars of international politics have often expressed skepticism about the efficacy of international agreements, formal military alliances have been an important feature of international politics for centuries. This essay first introduces the dominant explanation for why states sign alliance treaties: state leaders use formal alliances to convey credible information about their future intentions to partners and adversaries. It then considers empirical evidence in support of this perspective, particularly with regard to deterrence and compliance. Following this summary, I raise five puzzles that contemporary researchers are working to resolve, but which leave room for further analysis and development. First, I discuss the challenges faced by large n empirical studies of alliance formation. Next, I ask why strong states ally with weak states and consider some of the most compelling recent explanations. Third, I consider the complicated relationships between alliances and war. Fourth, I examine how alliances affect cooperation among member states. Finally, I encourage scholars to continue a recent focus on how alliances are designed. While we have seen significant progress in understanding military alliances over the last 20 years, primarily because of the development of game-theoretic models that capture strategic interaction and the collection of new data that allow for nuanced tests of the hypothesized relationships, there is good reason to believe that we will continue to see significant innovation over the next decade.

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“…There is a widespread perception of alliances as "weapons of power" instead of being "tools of management" (Schroeder, 1976).…”

Section: Figure 14 Model Of Trust Trustworthiness and Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Schroeder (1976) argues that alliances work, to a certain extent, as pacta de contrahendo, constraining and controlling the actions of the allies. To achieve a genuine relationships based on trust it is necessary to establish an appropriate culture linked to reputation sanctions (Kreps, 1990) or to subject behaviors to external organizational forms or Co -operation and conflict between firms, communities, New Social Movements and the role of government institutions which provide actors with a technology to limit abilities to use power (Levi, 1998).…”

Section: Figure 14 Model Of Trust Trustworthiness and Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional Economics of Cooperation and The Political Economy of Trust

Vargas-Hernández¹

2006

Paradigm: A Management Research Journal

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The aim of this paper is to analyze the institutional economics of co-operation and the political economy of trust. It is reviewed the transactions costs, the principal -agent theory, market power, increasing-returns theory and value creation, strategic management: competitive forces, resource-based theory, organizational knowledge and learning, strategic choice theory and the collective efficiency theory. Finally, it is sustained the political economy of trust.Key words: Co-operation, institutional economics, political economy, trust. ResumenEl objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la economía institucional de la cooperación y la economía polìtica de la confianza. Se revisan los costos de transacción, la teoría principal-agente, poder del mercado, la teoría de los retornos crecientes y creación de valor, la administración estratégica: Fuerzas competitivas, teoría basada en recursos, conocimiento y aprendizaje organizacional, elección racional y la teoría de eficiencia colectiva. Finalmente, se sustenta la economía política de la confianza.

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Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management

Cited by 75 publications

References 3 publications

Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties

Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties

Why Do States Sign Alliances?

Institutional Economics of Cooperation and The Political Economy of Trust

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