Allies in Transparency? Parliamentary, Judicial and Administrative Interplays in the EU’s International Negotiations

Abstract

International negotiations are an essential part of the European Union's (EU) external affairs. A key aspect to negotiations is access to and sharing of information among the EU institutions involved as well as to the general public. Oversight of negotiations requires insight into the topics of negotiation, the positions taken and the strategies employed. Concurrently, however, some space for confidentiality is necessary for conducting the negotiations and defending EU interests without fully revealing the limit negotiating positions of the EU to the negotiating partner. Hence, attaining a balance between the necessities of oversight and confidentiality in negotiations is the subject of a dynamic debate between the EU institutions. This paper provides a joint analysis on EU oversight institutions' position on transparency in international negotiations. We set out to answer whether parliamentary, judicial and administrative branches of oversight are allies in pursuing the objectives of transparency but also examine when their positions diverge.

How Much Is Enough? Explaining the Continuous Transparency Conflict in TTIP

“…Contrary to the other contributions in this issue that focused more on the institutional side of the initiative (Abazi & Adriaensen, 2017;Neuhold & Năstase, 2017), we focus in particular on the public consultation. During the period from July to October 2014, organizations and individuals were invited to provide their input on three concrete questions related to transparency: (i) concrete measures the EC could take to make the TTIP negotiations more transparent; (ii) best practices identified in other organizations; (iii) how transparency might affect the outcome of negotiations.…”

Transparency Watchdog: Guarding the Law and Independent from Politics? The Relationship between the European Ombudsman and the European Parliament

“…Secondly, case 262/2012/OV stemmed from a complaint regarding the refusal of public access to the minutes of meetings of coordinators of several EP Committees relating to the ACTA negotiations (see Abazi & Adriaensen, 2017). After some debate regarding the status of these documents (the EP claimed that there were no separate minutes of meetings of committee coordinators, rather that these were included in the minutes of the committee meetings themselves) the Parliament agreed to the Ombudsman's recommendation that decisions or recommendations adopted by the coordinators would, after their endorsement by the respective EP committee, be included in the committee minutes, and be accessible via the public register as of July 2014 onwards.…”

EU Institutional Politics of Secrecy and Transparency in Foreign Affairs

“…As information asymmetry decreases, the scope for shirking diminishes, as the principal is able to correct the agent's actions. In short, the balance of power shifts as the agent's privately held information diminishes (Abazi & Adriaensen, 2017;Coremans, 2017).…”

“…The Court provides a judicial review ensuring principles of the EU, however in foreign affairs when public access to information is concerned it seems to leave more discretionary space to the executive. Yet the Court seems more interventionist when parliamentary access to information is at stake (Abazi & Adriaensen, 2017). The approaches by the EO and the Court are focused on finding a proportionate balance between the necessities of secrecy and transparency in the EU's foreign policy, but as contributors in this thematic issue show, where to strike the balance is a contentious issue.…”

“…The EP has now in place a legal framework that facilitates access to sensitive information in foreign policy, but this has not necessarily resulted in more straightforward practice of access to information. In this light, Abazi and Adriaensen (2017) show that the Council's handling of information is not only questioned by the EP, but that the Commission and the Council too disagree on the need for public disclosure of important negotiating documents, as was the case with the TTIP mandate. They also find that the traditional divide between executive and legislative actors preferences on transparency may at times be proven to be misleading and that the Commission has been showing an increased support for public access to information as far as trade negotiations are concerned.…”