Allocation of Codecision Reports in the Fifth European Parliament

Høyland, Bjørn

doi:10.1177/1465116506060911

Cited by 50 publications

(47 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…As a result, intra-party group politics may play a smaller role in the second half of each parliamentary term. Additionally, Høyland (2006) finds evidence for a government-opposition dynamic between Council and EP. National parties that are represented in the Council write more co-decision reports than do 'opposition' MEPs.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 96%

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Participation and Political Competition in Committee Report Allocation

Hausemer

2006

European Union Politics

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International audienceThe paper models the consequences of committee report allocation for political representation in the European Parliament (EP). The range of legislators involved in each policy area affects the values, interests and constituencies that the Parliament represents. Thus, representation is defined as an MEP's participation in salient policy areas. The allocation of salient reports follows inter-and intra-party group dynamics. First, party groups compete for salient reports in a context of open voting rules in committee and plenum. Second, group coordinators distribute these reports among their MEPs in an attempt to maximize the cohesion of the group. The model is tested on data from the fifth European Parliament (1999-2002). The results confirm the impact of selective participation on political representation. The EP has evolved into a ‘normal' Parliament featuring coalitions and competition along a left-right cleavage party groups and a hierarchical allocation of legislative spoils parties

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Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 96%

“…National parties that are represented in the Council write more co-decision reports than do 'opposition' MEPs. However, as Høyland (2006) acknowledges, this effect is eclipsed by the importance of the party groups. PES representatives are 'more active than governing parties as co-decision rapporteurs'.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Participation and Political Competition in Committee Report Allocation

Hausemer

2006

European Union Politics

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“…The sectorally specialized committee structure of the Council resembles the structure of parliamentary committees in many respects. The assumption that members of Council committees are better informed than ministers about the actual consequences of legislative acts is also seems reasonable (see also Hoyland, 2006). Considering that committee members are directly accountable to their ministers, the potential for bureaucratic drift is limited in the Council, too.…”

Section: Uncertaintymentioning

confidence: 99%

Committee Decision-making in the Council of the European Union

Häge

2007

European Union Politics

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Committees of national officials play a major role in the decision-making of the European Union's main legislative body, the Council of Ministers. The study investigates the conditions under which bureaucrats decide on legislative dossiers without direct involvement of ministers. A statistical analysis is performed to examine this question, using an original data set of 439 legislative proposals. The results of the analysis indicate that formal institutional features such as the voting rule in the Council and the involvement of the European Parliament affect committee decision-making, whereas no effects of committee socialization and preference divergence among member states are identified. The results diminish concerns about the democratic legitimacy of Council decision-making to some extent, as the findings demonstrate that bureaucrats tend to decide only the less salient and more complex proposals.

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“…MEPs (Kaeding 2004(Kaeding , 2005, while others emphasise the role of their national party delegations (Kreppel 2002;Hoyland 2006), party groups (Benedetto 2005), or a combination of the two Raunio 2002, 2003;Lindberg 2008). However, despite the valuable insights these studies have brought, their findings are not always reconcilable.…”

Section: State Of the Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inter-institutional Rules and Division of Power in the European Parliament: Allocation of Consultation and Co-decision Reports

Yordanova¹

2010

West European Politics

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Studies on the European Parliament have largely overlooked the impact of the interinstitutional context on its internal organisation. This paper argues that the stronger legislative powers of the Parliament vis-a`-vis the Council of Ministers under the codecision than under the consultation procedure affect the intra-parliamentary allocation of different types of legislative report. The analysis of the period 2004-07 shows that legislators from the centre-right party group coalition and loyal party group members are privileged in the allocation of co-decision reports. In contrast, legislators with outlying special interests and experts are given systematic access to drafting only consultation reports. The higher competition for co-decision versus consultation reports left unchecked by the formal EP rules has thus been exploited by party group leaders to promote group cohesion and coalition-building, producing clear winners and losers.

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Allocation of Codecision Reports in the Fifth European Parliament

Cited by 50 publications

References 42 publications

Participation and Political Competition in Committee Report Allocation

Participation and Political Competition in Committee Report Allocation

Committee Decision-making in the Council of the European Union

Inter-institutional Rules and Division of Power in the European Parliament: Allocation of Consultation and Co-decision Reports

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