Allocation of fixed transmission cost to wheeling transactions by cooperative game theory

Tsukamoto, Y.; Iyoda, Isao

doi:10.1109/59.496131

Cited by 88 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…A cooperative game is defined as a game in which the players can conclude a contractual agreement as to which outcome will be chosen to exploit the possibility of common interests [11]. That is why transmission usage and cost allocation problem can be defined as cooperative game and it is easy to be applied.…”

Section: Shapley Value Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The cost depends upon the magnitude, the path and the distance travelled by the transacted power. Various modified MW Mile methodologies have been proposed in the literature [8][9][10].Tsukamoto and Iyoda [11] introduced the concept of cooperative game theory for fixed-cost allocation to wheeling transactions in a power system. Yu et al [12] presented a method for transmission embedded cost allocation based on the use of line capacity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Transmission Usage and Cost Allocation Using Shapley Value and Tracing Method: A Comparison

Rathore¹,

Agnihotri²,

Khan³

et al. 2014

ELELIJ

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Section: Shapley Value Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transmission Usage and Cost Allocation Using Shapley Value and Tracing Method: A Comparison

Rathore¹,

Agnihotri²,

Khan³

et al. 2014

ELELIJ

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show abstract

“…Initially, cooperative game theory methods have been proposed in the electricity markets as tools to provide robust solutions for the allocation of the transmission system's fixed costs (Tsukamoto and Iyoda, 1996;Stamtsis and Erlich, 2004). Since then, such methods have also been proposed for, inter alias, allocation of unit's start-up costs and inter TSOs compensation (Hu et al, 2006;Dietrich, Olmos and Perez-Arriaga, 2008).…”

Section: The Game In Capacity Marketsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative Game Theory Solutions in Regional European Capacity Markets

Stamtsis¹,

Lychnaras²

2016

Engineering and Industry

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The present paper investigates the use of cooperative game theory and its methods in the emerging landscape of the capacity markets in Europe. In order not to hinder the development of Europe's internal electricity market and to reduce the costs of ensuring the security of supply in electricity, the coordination between the continent's countries is deemed necessary on regional or even European level. Cooperative game theory methods are ideal to support the establishment of such coordination initiatives and then to allocate the savings occurring from this coordination in the most robust and rational way.

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“…Nucleolus and Shapley value (SV) solution concepts have been applied for network embedded cost allocation among the users and provide a stable solution to all participants. Tsukamoto and Iyoda [4] introduced the concept of cooperative game theory for fixed cost allocation to wheeling transactions. Yu et al [5] presented a Nucleolus and SV-based method for transmission embedded cost allocation for line capacity use.…”

Section: Probabilistic Game Approaches For Network Cost Allocation Imentioning

confidence: 99%

Probabilistic game approaches for network cost allocation

Bhakar

Sriram

Padhy

et al. 2010

IEEE PES General Meeting

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Abstract-In a restructured power market, the network cost is to be allocated between multiple players utilizing the system in varying capacities. Cooperative game approaches based on Shapley value and Nucleolus provide stable models for embedded cost allocation of power networks. Varying network usage necessitates the introduction of probabilistic approaches to cooperative games. This paper proposes a variety of probabilistic cooperative game approaches. These have variably been modeled based upon the probability of existence of players, the probability of existence of coalitions, and the probability of players joining a particular coalition along with their joining in a particular sequence. Application of these approaches to power networks reflects the system usage in a more justified way. Consistent and stable results qualify the application of probabilistic cooperative game approaches for cost allocation of power networks.

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Allocation of fixed transmission cost to wheeling transactions by cooperative game theory

Cited by 88 publications

References 7 publications

Transmission Usage and Cost Allocation Using Shapley Value and Tracing Method: A Comparison

Transmission Usage and Cost Allocation Using Shapley Value and Tracing Method: A Comparison

Cooperative Game Theory Solutions in Regional European Capacity Markets

Probabilistic game approaches for network cost allocation

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