Allocation rules for coalitional network games

Abstract

International audienceCoalitional network games are real-valued functions defined on a set of players organized into a network and a coalition structure. We adopt a flexible approach assuming that players organize themselves the best way possible by forming the efficient coalitional network structure. We propose two allocation rules that distribute the value of the efficient coalitional network structure: the atom-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule and the player-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule

Specification and estimation of network formation and network interaction models with the exponential probability distribution

“…Our equilibrium (stability) concept for the first stage of the game is based on the literature focused on the stability and efficiency of network formation games (e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Dutta and Jackson (2000), Jackson (2005), Caulier, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2015)). In this transferable utility setting, individuals are allowed to make side payments.…”

“…The formation of the network, that is, the first stage, follows the literature regarding the stability and efficiency of social networks (Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Dutta and Jackson (2000), Jackson (2005), Caulier, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2015)). Accordingly, we adopt a transferable utility framework that allows individuals to make side payments.…”

Two families of values for global cooperative games

“…This is our main objective. Other papers that study problems closely related to global games include Caulier et al (2015) and Rossi (2019). Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) propose and characterize a generalization of the Shapley value to global games.…”