2022
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2202.02672
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(Almost) Envy-Free, Proportional and Efficient Allocations of an Indivisible Mixed Manna

Abstract: We study the problem of finding fair and efficient allocations of a set of indivisible items to a set of agents, where each item may be a good (positively valued) for some agents and a bad (negatively valued) for others, i.e., a mixed manna. As fairness notions, we consider arguably the strongest possible relaxations of envy-freeness and proportionality, namely envy-free up to any item (EFX and EFX 0 ), and proportional up to the maximin good or any bad (PropMX and PropMX 0 ). Our efficiency notion is Pareto-o… Show more

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