Altruism, Altruistic Punishment and Social Investment

Jaffé, Klaus

doi:10.1023/b:acbi.0000043440.36462.1a

Cited by 18 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Consequently, in contrast to the interpretation of altruistic punishment [3], our results suggest that 3PP evolves because it ultimately bestows an evolutionary benefit to the individual engaging in it in contexts of high social-structural constraint. This interpretation is more in line with the theoretical work of [39], where punishment is viewed as a form of 'social investment'. Interestingly, in terms of empirical results, the fact that 3PP can evolve as a non-altruistic trait has only been shown in non-human species, where 3PP induces female cleaner fish to cooperate, and hence bestows a direct benefit to males [16].…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 72%

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High strength-of-ties and low mobility enable the evolution of third-party punishment

et al. 2014

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As punishment can be essential to cooperation and norm maintenance but costly to the punisher, many evolutionary game-theoretic studies have explored how direct punishment can evolve in populations. Compared to direct punishment, in which an agent acts to punish another for an interaction in which both parties were involved, the evolution of third-party punishment (3PP) is even more puzzling, because the punishing agent itself was not involved in the original interaction. Despite significant empirical studies of 3PP, little is known about the conditions under which it can evolve. We find that punishment reputation is not, by itself, sufficient for the evolution of 3PP. Drawing on research streams in sociology and psychology, we implement a structured population model and show that high strength-of-ties and low mobility are critical for the evolution of responsible 3PP. Only in such settings of high social-structural constraint are punishers able to induce self-interested agents toward cooperation, making responsible 3PP ultimately beneficial to individuals as well as the collective. Our results illuminate the conditions under which 3PP is evolutionarily adaptive in populations. Responsible 3PP can evolve and induce cooperation in cases where other mechanisms alone fail to do so.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 72%

“…In addition to focusing on 3PP, our model differs from related work on punishment in the literature [3,39] by allowing agents to punish antisocially. Allowing for the existence of antisocial punishment is crucial based on recent developments in the punishment-related literature.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

High strength-of-ties and low mobility enable the evolution of third-party punishment

et al. 2014

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“…Such behavior has typically been interpreted in terms of group-level benefits (3) despite theoretical predictions that third-party punishment can yield individual benefits to the punisher (4). Here, we show that male cleaner fish, Labroides dimidiatus, punish their female partners if females cheat while inspecting model clients.…”

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confidence: 69%

Punishers Benefit From Third-Party Punishment in Fish

Raihani

Grutter

Bshary

2010

Science

135

119

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H uman studies show that uninvolved bystanders often pay to punish defectors (1, 2). Such behavior has typically been interpreted in terms of group-level benefits (3) despite theoretical predictions that third-party punishment can yield individual benefits to the punisher (4). Here, we show that male cleaner fish, Labroides dimidiatus, punish their female partners if females cheat while inspecting model clients. Punishment promotes female cooperation, yielding direct foraging benefits to the male. This finding demonstrates empirically that third-party punishment can evolve via self-serving tendencies.When servicing clients, cleaners either cooperate by removing ectoparasites or cheat by taking a bite of mucus. Cleaners prefer to eat mucus (5) but risk clients terminating the interaction if they do (6). The conflict of interest between cleaner and client is less pronounced during inspections by cleaner pairs than during singleton inspections (7). Increased service quality during pair inspections was interpreted as resulting from female cooperation, both under natural conditions and in the laboratory where Plexiglas (acrylic plastic) plates serve as model clients. Larger males regularly chased smaller female partners if females caused clients to leave, particularly in the laboratory (7). This male behavior is peculiar because clients, not males, are the victims of biting females. Despite this fact, it is possible that male chasing could cause females to behave more cooperatively in future interactions. If males benefit personally through increased foraging success, then the males' behavior represents third-party punishment that evolves via self-regarding, rather than altruistic, tendencies.Cleaners were trained to feed off model clients (Plexiglas plates) containing two food types: preferred prawn and less-preferred fish flake (8). Eating prawn corresponded to cheating the client by eating mucus, whereas eating flake corresponded to cooperating by removing ectoparasites. Eating prawn resulted in the immediate removal of the plate. We replicated earlier results (7) that males more often chased females when the latter's behavior caused plate removal (Wilcoxon signedrank test, n = 8, V (rank sum of positive values of x = y) = 21, P = 0.036). After being chased, females were less likely to eat prawn again in the second plate presentation 60 s later (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, n = 8, V = 34, P = 0.030; Fig. 1A) and fed against their preference, eating a higher ratio of flake to prawns (Wilcoxon signedrank test, n = 8, V = 36, P = 0.008; Fig. 1B). This allowed males to increase their food intake in the second presentation (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, n = 8, V = 28, P = 0.02; Fig. 1C). Conversely, when chasing was prevented with a temporary partition, females that cheated in the first presentation were equally likely to cheat in the second one (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, n = 8, V = 11, P = 0.67; Fig. 1A) and did not eat a higher ratio of flake to prawn items (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, n = 8, V = 8, P = 0.35; Fig. 1B), a...

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“…For this classification, we need definitions of behaviour and social interaction. The definitions introduced by Jaffe [13] form a system that can be used in concrete situations such as multi-agent societies. Jaffe's system uses values for two terms, namely (1) S, which is the benefit for the society, and (2) I , which is the benefit for the individual.…”

Section: Social Behaviourmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The set can have, for instance, an egoistic or altruistic nature, and there might be specific rules which allow a society to thrive. We interpreted the different ethical concepts by using the definitions given by Jaffe [13].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Ethics in Agent Societies

Spronck

Berendsen

2009

Int J of Soc Robotics

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To investigate whether the theory of evolutionary ethics is a valid explanation for the existence of ethical behaviour, we approach the ethical issues of morality from a computational point-of-view. We define a model of multiagent societies, in which agents are able to evolve a moral sense. In the model, moral sense is defined by every agent's personal set of rules, which determines its interaction with other agents. By performing simulations of the model we investigate under what circumstances the agents in the societies develop a moral sense which allows the society to thrive. We use four conceptually different agent designs: agents with a minimum of attributes, agents with family relations, agents with a memory, and agents with reputation in the society. From our results we conclude that there are circumstances under which agents evolve ethical behaviour, those circumstances being specific settings of family relations and reputation.

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Altruism, Altruistic Punishment and Social Investment

Cited by 18 publications

References 22 publications

High strength-of-ties and low mobility enable the evolution of third-party punishment

High strength-of-ties and low mobility enable the evolution of third-party punishment

Punishers Benefit From Third-Party Punishment in Fish

Evolutionary Ethics in Agent Societies

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