Altruism and Its Impact on the Price of Anarchy

Chen, Po–An; Keijzer, Bart de; Kempe, David; Schäfer, Guido

doi:10.1145/2597893

Cited by 52 publications

(95 citation statements)

References 65 publications

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“…In Section 5, capacity restrictions are added to the previously analyzed games and pure Nash equilibria existence and bounds for PoA and PoS are summarized from previous work from Rodrigues and Xavier [19]. Altruism in facility location games is explored in Section 6, where we adapted results for the cost sharing game [20] to facility location games. In each of these sections we discuss the case where instances of the game satisfies the triangle inequality as well.…”

Section: Contributions and Text Organizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [20], the definition of smooth games is extended to incorporate altruism, while maintaining most of the properties proved for the original concept.…”

Section: Smooth Games and Altruismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A similar game to the Facility Location Game with Fair Cost sharing (FLG-FC) seen in Section 4, denominated Fair-Cost Sharing Game, has been considered in [20]. In this game, there are no connection costs between terminals and facilities.…”

Section: Fair Cost Sharing Games With Altruismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furthermore, while in the FLG-FC each terminal may choose any facility to open, in the Fair-Cost Sharing Game each player has to connect his clients to some subset of facilities given as an input to the game. Below we adapt the results in [20] to the FLG-FC game.…”

Section: Fair Cost Sharing Games With Altruismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Instance of FLG-FC with PoA equal to k 1−α where every player is α-altruistic, first described in [20]. Connections cost are equal to zero.…”

Section: Fair Cost Sharing Games With Altruismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Non-Cooperative Facility Location Games: a Survey

Rodrigues¹,

Xavier²

2017

RITA

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Resumo: O problema de Localização da Instalações é um problema de otimização combinatória NP-Difícil bem conhecido na literatura. Ele modela uma gama de situações onde se pretende fornecer um conjunto de bens ou serviços através de um conjunto de instalações F para um conjunto de clientes T, também denominados terminais. Há custos de abertura para cada instalação em F e custos de conexão para cada par de instalações e clientes (f,t), onde a instalação f atende o cliente t. Uma autoridade central busca determinar uma solução com um custo mínimo, considerando os custos de abertura e conexão, de tal maneira que todos os clientes sejam supridos por uma instalação. Nesta resenha literária, estamos interessados na versão de jogo não cooperativa desse problema, em que, em vez de existir uma autoridade central, cada cliente é um jogador e decide em qual instalação se conectar. Ao escolher a instalação, cada cliente pretende minimizar seus próprios custos, dado pelos custos de conexão e custos de abertura da instalação, que podem ser compartilhados entre os clientes que usam a mesma instalação. Este problema é relevante a várias aplicações práticas, especialmente em cenários distribuídos, onde uma autoridade central é muito dispendiosa ou impossível de existir. Neste artigo, apresentamos uma resenha da literatura existente descrevendo diferentes variantes desse problema e revisando vários resultados sobre eles, além de adaptar os resultados da literatura existente sobre a existência de equilíbrio, Preço da Anarquia e Preço de Estabilidade. Também destacamos alguns problemas em aberto que ainda não foram abordados na literatura. Abstract: The Facility Location problem is a well-know NP-Hard combinatorial optimization problem. It models a diverse set of situations where one aims to provide a set of goods or services via a set of facilities F to a set of clients T , also called terminals. There are opening costs for each facility in F and connection costs for each pair of facility and client, if such facility attends this client. A central authority wants to determine the solution with minimum cost, considering both opening and connection costs, in such a way that all clients are attended by one facility. In this survey we are interested in the non-cooperative game version of this problem, where instead of having a central authority, each client is a player and decides where to connect himself. In doing so, he aims to minimize his own costs, given by the connection costs and opening costs of the facility, which may be shared among clients using the same facility. This problem has several applications as well, specially in distributed scenarios where a central authority is too expensive or even infeasible to exist. In this paper we present a survey describing different variants of this problem and reviewing several results about it, as well as adapting results from existing literature concerning the existence of equilibria, Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability. We also point out open problems that remain to be addressed.P...

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Section: Contributions and Text Organizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [20], the definition of smooth games is extended to incorporate altruism, while maintaining most of the properties proved for the original concept.…”

Section: Smooth Games and Altruismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Fair Cost Sharing Games With Altruismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Fair Cost Sharing Games With Altruismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Instance of FLG-FC with PoA equal to k 1−α where every player is α-altruistic, first described in [20]. Connections cost are equal to zero.…”

Section: Fair Cost Sharing Games With Altruismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Non-Cooperative Facility Location Games: a Survey

Rodrigues¹,

Xavier²

2017

RITA

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The Impact of Tribalism on Social Welfare

Han

Soloviev

Wang

2019

Algorithmic Game Theory

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We explore the impact of mutual altruism among the players belonging to the same set -their tribe -in a partition of all players in arbitrary strategic games upon the quality of equilibria attained. To this end, we introduce the notion of a τ -tribal extension of an arbitrary strategic game, in which players' subjective cost functions are updated to reflect this, and the associated Price of Tribalism, which is the ratio of the social welfare of the worst Nash equilibrium of the tribal extension to that of the optimum of social welfare. We show that in a well-known game of friendship cliques, network contribution games as well as atomic linear congestion games, the Price of Tribalism is higher than the Price of Anarchy of either the purely selfish players or fully altruistic players (i.e. ones who seek to maximise the social welfare). This phenomenon is observed under a variety of equilibrium concepts. In each instance, we present upper bounds on the Price of Tribalism that match the lower bounds established by our example.

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Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games with Altruistic/Spiteful Players

Schröder

2020

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Altruism and Its Impact on the Price of Anarchy

Cited by 52 publications

References 65 publications

Non-Cooperative Facility Location Games: a Survey

Non-Cooperative Facility Location Games: a Survey

The Impact of Tribalism on Social Welfare

Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games with Altruistic/Spiteful Players

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