2020
DOI: 10.1103/physrevresearch.2.013374
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Altruism in populations at the extinction transition

Abstract: We study the evolution of cooperation as a birth-death process in spatially extended populations. The benefit from the altruistic behavior of a cooperator is implemented by decreasing the death rate of its direct neighbours. The cost of cooperation is the increase of a cooperator's death rate proportional to the number of its neighbors. For any benefit-cost ratio above 1, the stable stationary concentrations of agents pass through four regimes as the baseline death rate p increases: (i) defection only, (ii) co… Show more

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Cited by 5 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…with a rate π − σ . Note that the dynamics can be seen as a birth-death process, hence suitable for being analyzed as in previous works [12,49]. Taking into account the steps (ii) and (iii) of the evolution given in the previous section, the rates can be written as…”
Section: Theoretical Description a Master Equationmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…with a rate π − σ . Note that the dynamics can be seen as a birth-death process, hence suitable for being analyzed as in previous works [12,49]. Taking into account the steps (ii) and (iii) of the evolution given in the previous section, the rates can be written as…”
Section: Theoretical Description a Master Equationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One of the mechanisms known to favor cooperation is the reciprocity induced by the spatial distribution of the players as shown by Nowak and May [8]. When interactions are no longer well-mixed and players are distributed in a spatial/topological structure, cooperators can cluster together and might survive surrounded by defectors, changing the mean-field equilibrium panorama of many games [9][10][11][12].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Let M (s) be the matrix of time-dependent coefficients of the system (A17). A necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the homogeneous solutions x i (s) to be unstable is that some eigenvalue of M (s) has positive real part for some time s ∈ [0, T ] (see a proof of a similar result in [31]). During these times, even if the trajectory turns out to be linearly stable, its stability is reduced and more susceptible to non-infinitesimal perturbations or noise.…”
Section: Re[λmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This state evolves as follows: (i) with a rate r, a randomly chosen individual (say, located at ν) dies, then (ii) two neighbors of the dead individual (thus pertaining to the set P ν of neighbors of ν) are chosen at random and compete to generate the offspring: a winner species is selected according to the probabilities in the dominance matrix H. And (iii) this offspring is immediately located at the vacant node. Following standard procedures (for example see [30,31]) the master equation for the probability p(S, t) of finding the system in a state S at time t can be written as…”
Section: Appendix A: Analytical Formulationmentioning
confidence: 99%