Altruism toward in-group members as a reputation mechanism

Mifune, Nobuhiro; Hashimoto, Hirofumi; Yamagishi, Toshio

doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.09.004

Cited by 152 publications

(124 citation statements)

References 46 publications

(45 reference statements)

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“…Haley and Fessler (25) found that contributions in an anonymous Dictator Game were higher when the computer monitor displayed a pair of stylized eyes than when it displayed plain text. The effects of eyes in the Dictator Game have been replicated (28)(29)(30) and seem to be a function of the expectation of future benefits, not fear of punishment (30).…”

Section: Critiques Of Interpretation Of Behavioral Economics Gamesmentioning

confidence: 92%

Evolutionary foundations of human prosocial sentiments

Silk

House²

2011

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

161

116

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A growing body of evidence shows that humans are remarkably altruistic primates. Food sharing and division of labor play an important role in all human societies, and cooperation extends beyond the bounds of close kinship and networks of reciprocating partners. In humans, altruism is motivated at least in part by empathy and concern for the welfare of others. Although altruistic behavior is well-documented in other primates, the range of altruistic behaviors in other primate species, including the great apes, is much more limited than it is in humans. Moreover, when altruism does occur among other primates, it is typically limited to familiar group members-close kin, mates, and reciprocating partners. This suggests that there may be fundamental differences in the social preferences that motivate altruism across the primate order, and there is currently considerable interest in how we came to be such unusual apes. A body of experimental studies designed to examine the phylogenetic range of prosocial sentiments and behavior is beginning to shed some light on this issue. In experimental settings, chimpanzees and tamarins do not consistently take advantage of opportunities to deliver food rewards to others, although capuchins and marmosets do deliver food rewards to others in similar kinds of tasks. Although chimpanzees do not satisfy experimental criteria for prosociality in food delivery tasks, they help others complete tasks to obtain a goal. Differences in performance across species and differences in performance across tasks are not yet fully understood and raise new questions for further study.prosocial preferences | punishment | fairness

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Section: Critiques Of Interpretation Of Behavioral Economics Gamesmentioning

confidence: 92%

Evolutionary foundations of human prosocial sentiments

Silk

House²

2011

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

161

116

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“…While subjects do allocate more goods to in-group members, they still share significant amounts with out-group members. Second, when the experimental design assures that the recipients of allocations do not know the group membership of the allocator while the allocator does know that he/she is playing with an in-group member, ingroup favouritism can disappear [58,59]. Revealing results were also obtained with respect to third-party punishment of allocators [60,61].…”

Section: (D) Studies On the Psychology Of Human Intergroup Relationsmentioning

confidence: 98%

The evolutionary interplay of intergroup conflict and altruism in humans: a review of parochial altruism theory and prospects for its extension

Rusch¹

2014

Proc. R. Soc. B.

153

126

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Drawing on an idea proposed by Darwin, it has recently been hypothesized that violent intergroup conflict might have played a substantial role in the evolution of human cooperativeness and altruism. The central notion of this argument, dubbed 'parochial altruism', is that the two genetic or cultural traits, aggressiveness against the out-groups and cooperativeness towards the in-group, including self-sacrificial altruistic behaviour, might have coevolved in humans. This review assesses the explanatory power of current theories of 'parochial altruism'. After a brief synopsis of the existing literature, two pitfalls in the interpretation of the most widely used models are discussed: potential direct benefits and high relatedness between group members implicitly induced by assumptions about conflict structure and frequency. Then, a number of simplifying assumptions made in the construction of these models are pointed out which currently limit their explanatory power. Next, relevant empirical evidence from several disciplines which could guide future theoretical extensions is reviewed. Finally, selected alternative accounts of evolutionary links between intergroup conflict and intragroup cooperation are briefly discussed which could be integrated with parochial altruism in the future.

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“…Assessing the strong hypothesis requires an approach with predictions that go beyond saying that reputational cues should increase altruism. Second, though many studies have provided evidence for the importance of payoff-irrelevant social cues (Haley and Fessler, 2005;Bateson et al, 2006;Burnham and Hare, 2007;Rigdon et al, 2009;Mifune et al, 2010;Ernest-Jones et al, 2011;Oda et al, 2011;Francey and Bergmüller, 2012), the evidence overall is mixed. Some studies have also failed to find an effect (Fehr and Schneider, 2010;Lamba and Mace, 2010;Carbon and Hesslinger, 2011;Tane and Takezawa, 2011;Ekström, 2012;Raihani and Bshary, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Eye spots do not increase altruism in children

Vogt

Efferson

Berger

et al. 2015

Evolution and Human Behavior

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The evolutionary legacy hypothesis proposes that an evolved reciprocity-based psychology affects human behavior in anonymous one-shot interactions when reciprocity is not explicitly possible. Empirical support rests on experiments showing that altruism among adults increases in the presence of stylized eye spots or faces. Such stimuli do not affect material payoffs, but they are assumed to activate a person's reciprocity-based psychology. We identify two versions of the evolutionary legacy hypothesis. The weak hypothesis posits that reputational concerns can generate altruism in the absence of opportunities for a good reputation. The strong hypothesis posits that reputational concerns alone can explain anonymous one-shot altruism, and they can do so specifically in lieu of explanations based on group selection. A number of experimental studies support the weak hypothesis but are merely consistent with the strong hypothesis. To address both the weak and strong hypotheses, we conducted an eye spot experiment with children. Altruism can vary by age or sex in childhood, and under the strong hypothesis this kind of variation should reveal associated variation in sensitivity to eye spots. Although we found significant variation in altruism among children, we found no corresponding variation in sensitivity to eye spots. More generally, we found no eye spot effects of any kind. We discuss the possibility that eye spots might only affect altruism under specific conditions. We further argue that conditional effects do not refute the weak hypothesis in any way, but they do suggest potential limitations on the explanatory scope of the strong hypothesis. 1 Abstract: The evolutionary legacy hypothesis proposes that an evolved reciprocitybased psychology affects human behavior in anonymous one-shot interactions when reciprocity is not explicitly possible. Empirical support rests on experiments showing that altruism among adults increases in the presence of stylized eye spots or faces. Such stimuli do not affect material payoffs, but they are assumed to activate a person's reciprocity-based psychology. We identify two versions of the evolutionary legacy hypothesis. The weak hypothesis posits that reputational concerns can generate altruism in the absence of opportunities for a good reputation. The strong hypothesis posits that reputational concerns alone can explain anonymous one-shot altruism, and they can do so specifically in lieu of a explanations based on group selection. A number of experimental studies support the weak hypothesis but are merely consistent with the strong hypothesis. To address both the weak and strong hypotheses, we conducted an eye spot experiment with children.Altruism can vary by age or sex in childhood, and under the strong hypothesis this kind of variation should reveal associated variation in sensitivity to eye spots.Although we found significant variation in altruism among children, we found no corresponding variation in sensitivity to eye spots. More generally, we found no eye spot effe...

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Altruism toward in-group members as a reputation mechanism

Cited by 152 publications

References 46 publications

Evolutionary foundations of human prosocial sentiments

Evolutionary foundations of human prosocial sentiments

The evolutionary interplay of intergroup conflict and altruism in humans: a review of parochial altruism theory and prospects for its extension

Eye spots do not increase altruism in children

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