Altruistic and self-serving goals modulate behavioral and neural responses in deception

Abstract

People tell lies not only for their own self-interests but sometimes also to help others. Little is known about the ways in which different types of goals modulate behaviors and neural responses in deception. The present study investigated the neural processes associated with spontaneous deception that occurs with altruistic reasons (i.e. the money would be donated to charity), self-serving reasons (i.e. the participant receives all of the money) and mixed goals (i.e. the money would be equally split between the participant and the charity). Altruistic motivation for deception reduced the intensity of moral conflict and the subsequent mental cost of resolving this conflict, reflected by a smaller N2–P3 effect in the purely altruistic condition. When making decisions about whether to lie, self-interest was a stronger motivator than others’ interests, and the participants tended to lie more for themselves than for others. When the lie could be mutually beneficial for both of the self and others, the participants tended to lie even when they knew that they could be easily caught, but they actually lied for their own self-interest rather than for altruistic reasons. These findings shed light on the neural basis of ‘good lies’ and decision-making in mutually beneficial situations.

Common and distinct neural correlates of self‐serving and prosocial dishonesty

“…It is important that we discuss our findings in light of two very recent cognitive neuroscience studies that also investigated the modulatory roles of social‐related goals on dishonest dicision‐making (Cui et al, ; Yin et al, ). One EEG study used the Coin‐Guessing task (Greene & Paxton, ) and found a higher propensity to be dishonest for self‐serving, compared with for prosocial, benefits (Cui et al, ), while the other fMRI study used the Sender‐Receiver Game (Gneezy, ) and found the opposite behavioral pattern (Yin et al, ). Because we used the same task as Cui et al' () study, and found replicating behavioral pattern with theirs, we attribute the discrepancy between ours and Yin et al' () to the difference in study design.…”

“…The study reported a reduction in the N2 component when participants were dishonest for prosocial, compared with self‐serving, benefits. Critically, unlike Yin et al (), Cui et al () found a higher propensity to be dishonest for self‐serving benefits than for prosocial benefits. Because scalp‐recorded EEG used in Cui et al' () study has a poor spatial resolution and may not detect signals from the brain areas that are further away from scalp (e.g., ventromedial prefrontal cortex [vmPFC] and striatum [Str]), the exact brain regions in which activity is modulated by social‐related goals is still unknown.…”

“…One EEG study used the Coin‐Guessing task (Greene & Paxton, ) and found a higher propensity to be dishonest for self‐serving, compared with for prosocial, benefits (Cui et al, ), while the other fMRI study used the Sender‐Receiver Game (Gneezy, ) and found the opposite behavioral pattern (Yin et al, ). Because we used the same task as Cui et al' () study, and found replicating behavioral pattern with theirs, we attribute the discrepancy between ours and Yin et al' () to the difference in study design. As argued by Cui et al (), deciding to be dishonest in the Sender‐Receiver Game involves a stronger concern about self‐image and reputation.…”

“…Thus, the Coin‐Guessing task is more akin to real‐life situations when people have opportunities to be dishonest for some kind of benefits, knowing that others are not aware of their dishonesty. This design may allow people to be dishonest if they are motivated to do so and may “show the real power of self‐interest drive” (Cui et al, ). The difference in a paradigm used may also explain the discrepancy in neural activity found Yin et al' () and ours.…”

“…In fact, in this example, self‐serving dishonesty provides self‐serving benefits at the cost of others. While numerous cognitive‐neuroscience studies have examined the neural basis of dishonest decision‐making using techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), and optical imaging (Abe & Greene, ; Baumgartner, Fischbacher, Feierabend, Lutz, & Fehr, ; Ding, Gao, Fu, & Lee, ; Garrett, Lazzaro, Ariely, & Sharot, ; Greene & Paxton, ; Hu, Pornpattananangkul, & Nusslock, ; Maréchal, Cohn, Ugazio, & Ruff, ; Sun, Chan, Hu, Wang, & Lee, ; Yin & Weber, ), it was not until recently that researchers started to investigate the extent to which social‐related goals of being dishonest (e.g., self‐serving vs. prosocial) modulate neural cognitive processes of dishonest decision‐making (Cui et al, ; Yin, Hu, Dynowski, Li, & Weber, ).…”