With the rapid miniaturization in sensor technology, ruddervator, arduino, and multi-rotor system, drone technology catches much attention of the researchers. It can be controlled remotely by a seated operator sitting to a powerful intelligence computer system (PICS) or an airborne control and command platform (AC2P). The two types of drones (reconnaissance and attacking) can communicate with each other and with the PICS or AC2P through wireless network channels referred to as Flying Ad Hoc Network or Unmanned Aerial Vehicular Network (FANET or UAVN). When the line of sight is broken, communication is mainly carried out through satellite using GPS (Global Positioning System) signals. Both GPS and UAVN/FANET use open network channels for data broadcasting, exposed to several threats, and its security is challenging for the researchers. Monitoring data transmission traffic, espionage, troop movement, border surveillance, searching and warfare battlefield phenomenon, etc., can auspiciously be achieved by developing a robust authentication scheme for IoD deployment military drone. Therefore, this research illustrates the designing of two separate protocols based on aggregate signature, identity, pairing cryptography, and Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) to guarantee data integrity, authorization, and confidentiality among drones and AC2P/PICS. The outdated data transmission flaw has also been tackled, which is frequently noted in prior protocols. The security of these protocols will formally be verified using a random oracle model (ROM), a real-or-random (ROR) model, and informally using pragmatic illustration and mathematical lemmas. Nonetheless, the performance analysis section will be executed using the algorithmic big-O notation. The results show that these protocols are verifiably protected in the Random Oracle Model (ROM) and Real-Or-Random (ROR) model using the CDHP.