Objective. This paper provides the first comprehensive assessment of the outcome of Paul Ehrlich's and Stephen Schneider's counteroffer (1995) to economist Julian Simon following Ehrlich's loss in the famous Ehrlich-Simon wager on economic growth and the price of natural resources (1980-1990). Our main conclusion in a previous article is that, for indicators that can be measured satisfactorily or can be inferred from proxies, the outcome favors Ehrlich-Schneider in the first decade following their offer. This second article extends the timeline towards the present time period to examine the long-term trends of each indicator and proxy, and assesses the reasons invoked by Simon to refuse the bet. Methods. Literature review, data gathering, and critical assessment of the indicators and proxies suggested or implied by Ehrlich and Schneider. Critical assessment of Simon's reasons for rejecting the bet. Data gathering for his alternative indicators. Results. For indicators that can be measured directly, the balance of the outcomes favors the Ehrlich-Schneider claims for the initial ten-year period. Extending the timeline and accounting for the measurement limitations or dubious relevance of many of their indicators, however, shifts the balance of the evidence towards Simon's perspective. Conclusion. The fact that Ehrlich and Schneider's own choice of indicators yielded mixed results in the long run, coupled with the fact that Simon's preferred indicators of direct human welfare yielded largely favorable outcomes is, in our opinion, sufficient to claim that Simon's optimistic perspective was largely validated.