We analytically identify two mechanisms that explain why a later arrival time for a pandemic-ending vaccine has an ambiguous effect on optimal social-distancing policy. We assess the net effect of these channels using a quantitative model solved for over a thousand parameter combinations. Optimal policy and welfare comparisons are both highly sensitive to beliefs about vaccine arrival. A policy of moving quickly to herd immunity by requiring social distancing for only the most vulnerable might be loosely justified for expected vaccine arrivals over 2 years, but becomes catastrophic if the expected arrival is within a year.
| INTRODUCTIONExpectations about the time needed to develop and distribute a COVID-19 vaccine evolved quickly during the first year of the pandemic. An informal survey of experts from February 2020 concluded that developing, licensing, and manufacturing a vaccine within 12 months would be remarkable, even revolutionary (Kormann, 2020). In July, a formal expert elicitation put September 2021 as the best guess for widespread public access (Kane et al., 2020). Many also recognized that a vaccine might prove elusive, as it has for other important diseases, such as AIDS and the common cold. In the end, the vaccine arrived faster than expected, with Britain becoming the first Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development country to approve a vaccine on December 3, 2020.At least since Yaari (1965), economists have understood the relation between discounting and the expected time of an event that ends a problem: death in Yaari's setting and vaccine arrival in the epidemic context. Earlier expected arrival makes the future less extensive and therefore less important, having qualitatively the same effect on optimal planning as a higher discount rate. Nevertheless, the impact of vaccine arrival in a Susceptible-Infected-Removed