Ambiguity in Indonesian Cartelized Democracy: An Analysis on the Political Communication

Abstract

This paper describes and analyzes political parties in Indonesia's democratic transition from their political communication patterns in ambiguity of cartelized democracy, where political parties work together to enjoy the state's resources and conflict simultaneously. Three conceptions are being used to explain the patterns of political communication occur among coalition parties: first is the output of political process, which contains political impression management and substantive action; secondly, the definition of the situation; and finally the cartel party. The conclusion shows that of political communication among coalition parties tend to be most stable when there is an entity that could dominate the popularity and public support. The pattern changed to be in conflict when there is no one could dominate the popularity and political structure.

Indonesia’s political culture in the new digital age: A preliminary discussion

“…The robust popularity SBY built through mass media was unmatched in the 2009 elections. His reputation outpaced other candidates, and he easily won the election (Ahmad & Herdiansah 2013). Nonetheless, despite his new media expertise, SBY continued to exercise patronage-based power for followers with strong political ambition.…”

The intervention of oligarchy in the Indonesian legislative process

“…This collusion resulted in an agreement to establish a consensus regarding a specific policy choicein this study, to ratify the presidential threshold. Interparty collusion has been a dynamic after Soeharto, and the relations imbalance between parliament and the president in a multiparty system engenders power-sharing opportunities across political parties (Ahmad and Herdiansah, 2012;Ufen, 2006). Political lobbying aims to harmonize the parties' interests and create a harmonious interparty interest in the executive (president and his ministers) and legislative (parliament).…”

“…In the case of the legislative process of Election Act 7/2017, Jokowi's government was concerned to remain ascendant in the presidential election in 2019; a big coalition is essential to better penetrate political parties and then exploit them to pass a bill into legislation. This situation reflects Detterbeck (2005) and Katz and Mair (2009), that party-state fusion is a cartel in nature, employing codifying electoral regulation for the political advantage of the ruling parties’ aim to expand their domination in the economy and access state assets (Ahmad and Herdiansah, 2012).…”