Ambiguous Reference

Nichols, Shaun; Pinillos, N. Ángel; Mallon, Ron

doi:10.1093/mind/fzv196

Cited by 54 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…We found tentative evidence that thinking style may be associated with semantic judgments. Overall, the results are in line with previous studies, where judgments have not been clear-cut between internalism and externalism (Malt 1994;Braisby et al 1996;Jylkkä et al 2009;Genone & Lombrozo 2012;Nichols et al 2015;Tobia et al forthcoming), or between superficial properties and deep structure (e.g. Keil 1989;Medin & Ortony 1989;Rips 2001;Gelman 2003Gelman , 2004.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 92%

“…Experimental work has also been carried out on the semantics of natural kind terms, directly (Braisby et al 1996;Jylkkä et al 2009;Genone & Lombrozo 2012;Nichols et al 2015;Tobia conflicts with a theory of reference, that would count as evidence against the theory in question. In what follows, we will take this as uncontroversialfor more detailed discussion of these issues, see Cohnitz & Haukioja 2013. et al forthcoming).…”

Section: Theoretical Background and Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Existing experimental studies on ordinary speakers' use of natural kind terms have not explicitly distinguished between the necessity and sufficiency questions (e.g. Malt 1994;Braisby et al 1996;Genone & Lombrozo 2012;Jylkkä et al 2013;Nichols et al 2015;Tobia et al forthcoming) In this paper, we present results from three experiments that were conducted on ordinary speakers' usage of natural kind terms. We used two types of case: Twin Earth scenarios, where participants had to categorize samples of a natural kind that had identical appearance but a different deep structure from the standard samples, and reverse Twin Earth scenarios, where deep structure, but not appearance, was shared with the standard samples.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

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Reports from Twin Earth: Both deep structure and appearance determine the reference of natural kind terms

Haukioja¹,

Nyquist²,

Jylkkä³

2019

Preprint

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Following the influential thought experiments by Hilary Putnam and others, philosophers of language have for the most part adopted semantic externalism concerning natural kind terms. In this paper, we present results from three experiments on the reference of natural kind terms. Our results confirm some standard externalist assumptions, but are in conflict with others: ordinary speakers take both appearance and underlying nature to be central in their categorization judgments. Moreover, our results indicate that speakers’ categorization judgments are gradual, and proportional to the degree of similarity between new samples and familiar, “standard” samples. These findings pose problems for traditional theories, both externalist and internalist.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 92%

Section: Theoretical Background and Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

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Reports from Twin Earth: Both deep structure and appearance determine the reference of natural kind terms

Haukioja¹,

Nyquist²,

Jylkkä³

2019

Preprint

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“…So members of the community use it sometimes according to one convention, sometimes according to another. This sort of view of a term is not appealing but it has been urged for a few names—those of authors, like “Shakespeare” (Devitt, , p. 428 n. 9; , p. 12 n. 8)—and for all natural kind terms (Nichols, Pinillos, & Mallon, ). In any case, although the view could explain a variation in usage from context to context, it could not explain the variation in question, a variation in the one context. We could say that, within what seems to be the one speech community, one group of people participates only in a descriptive convention for names, another, only in a causal‐historical convention.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Reference of Proper Names: Testing Usage and Intuitions

Devitt

Porot

2018

Cognitive Science

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Experiments on theories of reference have mostly tested referential intuitions. We think that experiments should rather be testing linguistic usage. Substantive Aim (I): to test classical description theories of proper names against usage by "elicited production." Our results count decisively against those theories. Methodological Aim (I): Machery, Olivola, and de Blanc () claim that truth-value judgment experiments test usage. Martí () disagrees. We argue that Machery et al. are right and offer some results that are consistent with that conclusion. Substantive Aim (II): Machery et al. provide evidence that the usage of a name varies, being sometimes descriptive, sometimes not. In seven out of eight tests of usage, we did not replicate this variation. Methodological Aim (II): to test the reliability of referential intuitions by comparing them with linguistic usage. Earlier studies led us to predict that we would find those intuitions unreliable, but we did not. Our results add to evidence that tests of referential intuition are susceptible to unpredictable wording effects.

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“…The positive program accepts that there can be variation in intuitions, but aims to explain that variation in terms of some shared cognitive mechanism(s). For example, the theories of natural kind terms offered by Braisby et al (1996) and Nichols et al (2015) (discussed in section 4.2) involve variations on the idea that natural kind terms are systematically ambiguous. Variation in intuitions about natural kind terms can then potentially be explained as the result of different ways of resolving the relevant ambiguity.…”

Section: Methodological Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental Philosophy of Language

Hansen¹

2015

Oxford Handbooks Online

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Experimental philosophy of language uses experimental methods developed in the cognitive sciences to investigate topics of interest to philosophers of language. This article describes the methodological background for the development of experimental approaches to topics in philosophy of language, distinguishes negative and positive projects in experimental philosophy of language, and evaluates recent experimental work that concerns the reference of proper names and natural kind terms. The reliability of expert linguistic judgments versus the linguistic judgments of ordinary speakers, the role that different forms of ambiguity play in influencing responses to experiments, and the reliability of metalinguistic judgments are also assessed.

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Ambiguous Reference

Cited by 54 publications

References 49 publications

Reports from Twin Earth: Both deep structure and appearance determine the reference of natural kind terms

Reports from Twin Earth: Both deep structure and appearance determine the reference of natural kind terms

The Reference of Proper Names: Testing Usage and Intuitions

Experimental Philosophy of Language

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