Ambivalence, Valuational Inconsistency, and the Divided Self

Abstract

Consider a person whose evaluative stance toward life is riddled with a particular kind of affective conflict: he is attracted to seemingly incompatible goods; he values various things that he knows cannot co-exist; he is drawn to ways of life that are not compatible or reconcilable. I have in mind here not the hypocrite, who says one thing and does another, nor the waffler, who feels differently at different times and in different circumstances. Nor am I concerned here with mere conflicts of desire. Instead the person I am describing is one who has an honest, stable, but inconsistent evaluative stance toward the world-not divided merely about what he wants, but about what he feels is worth wanting. This person may not be logically inconsistent-he does not believe any contradictions-rather, his endorsed attitudes and desires fail to add up to an internally coherent, unified, evaluative outlook on life. He cares about things that essentially conflict, about things that cannot fit together. He is, in a sense I define more precisely below, valuationally inconsistent.Of course, this person will find it hard to be satisfied with the world. But some philosophers think there is something else wrong with such inconsistency, and something worse: that such inconsistency is somehow intrinsically bad for an agent, rendering him irrational, self-undermining, or non-autonomous. Here I argue against this view: there is nothing much wrong, I claim, with valuational inconsistency, at least from the point of view of the self. In particular, such ''inconsistency'' raises the same difficulties for an agent as ordinary conflictedness, of the kind most of us, with our multiple life roles and overlapping concerns, experience every day. Of course, claims of rationality are always difficult to assess, given the plasticity of the term. I will argue here for four specific conclusions about valuational inconsistency: it does not AMBIVALENCE, VALUATIONAL INCONSISTENCY, AND THE DIVIDED SELF 41

Ambivalence and Self‐Deception: Reframing the Debate

“…Penn State University NOTES 1 'Ethical Consistency', in Williams (1976). 2 See, for a sample, Benson (2005), Blackburn (2014), Gunnarsson (2014), Marino (2011), Moran, Poltera (2010), Rorty (2010), Schechtman (2014), Schramme (2014), Velleman (2006), and Wolf (2002.…”

“…For example, cases of ambivalently judging it both good and bad to tell a devastating truth to a friend are recast as judging harmoniously that there is something for as well as something against telling the truth to the friend' (2016,42). 23 Similarly, Patricia Marino (2011) claims that 'the valuationally inconsistent person need not be logically inconsistent: even faced with the fact that he values or cares about A and not-A, the agent may say that A is good in a way and not-A good in another…' On this basis, Marino argues that 'valuational consistency [as opposed to logical consistency] is not tied to rationality'. In this respect, Marino's argument for this conclusion exhibits the same rationalistic assumption I discuss in the following with respect to Velleman's position.…”

“…See, for a sample, Benson (), Blackburn (), Gunnarsson (), Marino (), Moran, Poltera (), Rorty (), Schechtman (), Schramme (), Velleman (, ), and Wolf (2002). …”

“…Similarly, Patricia Marino () claims that ‘the valuationally inconsistent person need not be logically inconsistent: even faced with the fact that he values or cares about A and not‐A, the agent may say that A is good in a way and not‐A good in another…’ On this basis, Marino argues that ‘valuational consistency [as opposed to logical consistency] is not tied to rationality’. In this respect, Marino's argument for this conclusion exhibits the same rationalistic assumption I discuss in the following with respect to Velleman's position.…”

The openness of attitudes and action in ambivalence

“…Baker (2010) andMarino (2011) also defend the existence and rationality of ambivalence between action-based desires. However, both claim that rational ambivalence requires prioritisation.…”