America First populism, social volatility, and self-reported arrests

Abstract

Despite research on the causes of populism and on the narratives of populist leaders, there is little empirical work on the relationship between populist attitudes and behavior, notably including criminal behavior. Our overarching concern is the recurrent social volatility of metaphorical populist themes that are central to impactful political messaging. Drawing on a national United States survey conducted around the 2016 election, we use multilevel models to show that the politically charged exclusionary boundaries of “America First” populism are behaviorally connected to increased odds of having been arrested. We argue that the rapid redrawing of social boundaries that make up populist attitudes is closely connected with the effects of economic and political frustrations during times of rapid social change. In the process, we develop a behavioral analysis of the social volatility of the recurrent populist movement in America.

“Utopia shut up shop”: Hopeless Futures, Populism, and the American Dream

“…]. Previous work has, indeed, linked ‘America first’ beliefs to lifetime criminal justice contact [Levi, Sendroiu, and Hagan 2020]. While the focus here is not criminality, we can nonetheless see a similar link between newly found hopelessness and relatively anomic adaptations.…”

“…When this does not, in fact, take place, individuals employ a variety of adaptations to deal with their dashed hopes, crime among them [Ibid.]. Previous work has, indeed, linked 'America first' beliefs to lifetime criminal justice contact [Levi, Sendroiu, and Hagan 2020]. While the focus here is not criminality, we can nonetheless see a similar link between newly found hopelessness and relatively anomic adaptations.…”

“…The second populism index is less specific to the current political moment, and instead gets at the feelings of political (in)efficacy implied in identifying with a virtuous people who have no say in the political projects of elites. Following Levi, Sendroiu, and Hagan [2020], I call this ‘no say’ populism, and so included measures of the respondents’ beliefs that they have no say in the political process. The measures in this index therefore ask respondents how strongly they agree (1-5) with the following three statements: “[p]ublic officials don’t care much what people like me think,” “[p]eople like me don’t have any say about what the government does,” and “[m]ost politicians do not care about the people.”…”

“…As a utopian narrative of progress, the American Dream helps smooth over injustice or marginality with view to a better future [Koselleck 2000[Koselleck , 2002[Koselleck , 2004, serving this purpose both historically [Grandin 2019] and for marginalized minorities [Lamont 2000]. Conversely, the breakdown of a narrative of progress like the American Dream brings to the fore feelings of deep injustice such as those elaborated through the "America first" and 'make America great again' movement [see for instance Hochschild 2016]; this can render populism an adaptation to anomie of the sort Merton [1938] wrote about many decades ago when also taking on the breakdown of the American Dream [see also Levi, Sendroiu, and Hagan 2020].…”

“…The models also include political attitudes specific to the populist moment, in order to look at whether utopian narratives of progress are associated with populist discontent. These are derived from Levi, Sendroiu, and Hagan [2020], who built on past conceptual models of populism to develop three indexes getting at different aspects of populist attitudes for the specific America first moment. The models presented here use two of these indexes.…”