American voter to economic voter: Evolution of an idea

Lewis‐Beck, Michael S.; Stegmaier, Mary

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2009.05.023

Cited by 34 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…This may be the case even in contexts where insurance markets, that could step in to compensate for income loss and economic hardship, are incomplete (Carroll and Kimball 2008;Carroll 1997), or where welfare markets are lacking all together (Gill and Ilahi 2000). These propositions are consistent with evidence that in more and less democratic regimes, assessments of economic performance inform voter attitudes toward government and the vote more broadly (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2009;Tilley et al 2018;Campello and Zucco 2015).…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 73%

“…This proposition is in line with studies on economic voting. As existing research shows, in developed and developing economies, voters often rely on their pocketbooks to infer how the government, or the incumbent, are performing (Campello and Zucco 2015;Rosenfeld 2018;Duch and Stevenson 2008;Healy and Malhotra 2012;Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2009;Tilley et al 2018). Finally, the argument is in line with recent scholarship on patrimonial voting, which argues that the possession of high-or lowrisk assets affects support for right and left-wing parties respectively Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2011;Persson and Martinsson 2016).…”

Section: The Political Consequences Of Self-insurancesupporting

confidence: 62%

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The Political Consequences of Self-Insurance: Evidence from Central-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia

Tertytchnaya

Vries

2018

Polit Behav

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Does self-insurance, such as access to savings or assets, affect support for government? While existing research recognizes that households' ability to privately manage income risk and economic uncertainty influences voter redistributive preferences, we know relatively little about how self-insurance affects evaluations of government in the first place. To gain traction on this question, we combine crosssectional and panel public opinion surveys from 28 countries in Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia with macro-data on economic performance. Exploiting variation in citizen responses to the Great Recession, we show that by enabling citizens to smooth consumption, self-insurance affects how they form economic perceptions. Moreover, we find that self-insurance bolsters support for incumbents. Results allow us to better understand why economic downturns may not dampen support for government, even when economic hardship is rife and access to public safety nets is limited.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 73%

Section: The Political Consequences Of Self-insurancesupporting

confidence: 62%

The Political Consequences of Self-Insurance: Evidence from Central-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia

Tertytchnaya

Vries

2018

Polit Behav

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“…Voting is therefore largely ''economic'' or ''pocketbook'' (Hibbs 1982;Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2009). Voting is therefore largely ''economic'' or ''pocketbook'' (Hibbs 1982;Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2009).…”

Section: The Effect Of Democracy On Transparencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Democracy and Transparency

Hollyer

Rosendorff

Vreeland

2011

The Journal of Politics

345

167

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Are democracies more transparent than other types of political regimes? Many people believe that the presence of elections alone is not sufficient for a country to be considered democratic and that transparency must be included as part of the definition of political regime. We agree that contestability of elections and transparency of policymaking are analytically distinct concepts. Adopting minimalist approaches to democracy and transparency, we ask a basic question: do electoral politics provide incentives for governments to disseminate data? We thus investigate theoretically the relationship between regime type and the willingness of policy makers to provide credible announcements on policy-relevant variables. And we demonstrate empirically that the availability (or absence) of policy-relevant data is correlated with regime type, even after controlling for GDP per capita, IMF participation, country fixed-effects, and time trends 1 . Democracies are indeed more transparent.

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“…Although sometimes credited to the ‘lost chapter’ (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2009) in Campbell et al’s path-breaking work, The American Voter (Campbell et al, 1960), economic voting research usually takes CAE Goodhart and RJ Bhansali’s (1970) and Gerald Kramer’s (1971) seminal contributions as its reference point. These early works were grounded in the neat two-party competition of the UK and the US, where voters had a clear choice between two candidates (parties) and their economic record.…”

Section: The Evolution Of the Economic Voting Paradigmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Counter-cyclical Voting in the United Kingdom

Bojar

2017

Political Studies

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By extending the time-tested reward–punishment hypothesis in economic voting, this article argues that rational voters hold incumbents accountable for the macroeconomic policies they pursue rather than purely for the economic climate that prevails under their tenure. Building on this premise, I first put forward a theory where business cycle fluctuations realign relative fiscal preferences among income groups. This theory’s implications predict that the aggregate electoral response to fiscal decisions evolves in a counter-cyclical fashion. Using quarterly measures of vote intention shares of incumbent parties in the United Kingdom, I provide time-series evidence from a set of error correction models supporting this proposition: at times of low unemployment, the electorate punishes profligate incumbents; in deteriorating labour market conditions, however, they reward expansionary policies. The immediate electoral impact is non-significant across the models, and most of the estimated effect is spread out across subsequent quarters.

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American voter to economic voter: Evolution of an idea

Cited by 34 publications

References 51 publications

The Political Consequences of Self-Insurance: Evidence from Central-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia

The Political Consequences of Self-Insurance: Evidence from Central-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia

Democracy and Transparency

Counter-cyclical Voting in the United Kingdom

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