American Women Philosophers: Institutions, Background and Thought

Katzav, Joel; Rogers, Dorothy; Vaesen, Krist

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-24437-7_1

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A Completely Author‐controlled System1

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2023

2024

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Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…The important difference, as compared to the present system, is that ‘[a]uthors, rather than editors, would thus decide whether and how to revise in light of comments received, when to consider their papers to be final or to retract. Moreover, authors would record their decisions and the subsequent reception of their work in a public way, alongside their published work’ (Katzav & Vaesen, 2017, p. 16). In other words, this will be a completely author‐controlled system of publication .…”

Section: A Completely Author‐controlled Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophy without peer review?

Hansson¹

2023

Theoria

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Section: A Completely Author‐controlled Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophy without peer review?

Hansson¹

2023

Theoria

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Revisiting Grace de Laguna’s critiques of analytic philosophy and of pragmatism

Katzav

2024

AJPH

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I revisit my paper, ‘Grace de Laguna’s 1909 Critique of Analytic Philosophy’ and respond to the commentary on it. I respond to James Chase and Jack Reynolds by further analysing the difference between speculative philosophy as de Laguna conceived of it and analytic philosophy, by clarifying how her critique of analytic philosophy remains relevant to some of its more speculative forms, and by explaining what justifies the criticism of established opinion that goes along with her rejection of analytic philosophy’s epistemic conservatism. In response to Andreas Vrahimis, I contextualise my reading of de Laguna’s work in 1909. This clarifies her critique of pragmatism, distinguishes it from her critique of epistemically conservative philosophy, and shows that she was not only already aware of the full scope of the latter critique but is likely to have identified the then incipient analytic philosophy as its primary target. Also, contra Vrahimis, her argument is effective against Bertrand Russell’s later, epistemically conservative approach to philosophy. In response to Cheryl Misak, I point out that her argument that de Laguna is, despite herself, a pragmatist rests on a misunderstanding of the differences between pragmatism and idealism, and I show that de Laguna’s main early influences were Herbert Spencer and her teacher, James Edwin Creighton. I further argue that Misak’s rejection of de Laguna’s critique of pragmatism rests on a misrepresentation of the critique.

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American Women Philosophers: Institutions, Background and Thought

Cited by 2 publications

References 43 publications

Philosophy without peer review?

Philosophy without peer review?

Revisiting Grace de Laguna’s critiques of analytic philosophy and of pragmatism

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