Amodal completion and knowledge

Helton, Grace; Nánay, Bence

doi:10.1093/analys/any063

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…One of the authors is a theorist of this stripe, having argued that safety is not necessary for knowledge(Helton & Nanay, 2019). This view is consistent with the view that safety is a good if defeasible proxy for whether some process is knowledge-conferring.…”

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confidence: 53%

Hot-cold empathy gaps and the grounds of authenticity

Helton,

2023

Synthese

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Hot-cold empathy gaps are a pervasive phenomena wherein one's predictions about others skew 'in the direction' of one's own current visceral states. For instance, when one predicts how hungry someone else is, one's prediction will tend to reflect one's own current hunger state. These gaps also obtain intrapersonally, when one attempts to predict what one oneself would do at a different time. In this paper, we do three things: First, we draw on empirical evidence to argue that so-called hotcold empathy gaps arise when one projects one's own current state into a simulation about another. Second, we argue that this process does not typically confer knowledge, even when the predictions it produces happen to be accurate. Third, we suggest that these results can be used to develop a challenge for L.A. Paul's view that authentic action sometimes requires a certain kind of experience-based knowledge of one's own values and of how these values relate to relevant outcomes. We then sketch an alternative view of the epistemic grounds of authenticity, one on which authenticity requires a kind of understanding. The relevant form of understanding can be achieved by knowledge from first-personal experience but can also be achieved elsewise, such as through testimony from a close friend about what one values.

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confidence: 53%

Hot-cold empathy gaps and the grounds of authenticity

Helton,

2023

Synthese

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“…Given that amodal completion is not just causally but also epistemically sensitive to our beliefs and background knowledge (see Helton & Nanay, 2019), it is just not the case that perceptual beliefs are beliefs whose prima facie justification does not depend on evidential relation to any other beliefs. The prima facie justification of perceptual beliefs depends on amodal completion and the prima facie justification of amodal completion depends on our beliefs and background knowledge.…”

Section: Justification-based Approaches To Perceptual Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

Against the very idea of a perceptual belief

Helton

Nánay

2022

Philosophical Books

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The aim of this paper is to argue that there is no unproblematic way of delineating perceptual beliefs from non-perceptual beliefs. The concept of perceptual belief is one of the central concepts not only of philosophy of perception but also of epistemology in a broad foundationalist tradition. Philosophers of perception talk about perceptual belief as the interface between perception and cognition and foundationalist epistemologists understand perceptual justification as a relation between perceptual states and perceptual beliefs. I consider three ways of cashing out the difference between perceptual and non-perceptual beliefs (semantic, justificatory, and etiological) and argue that none of them works. Finally, I explore the possibility of understanding perceptual justification without relying on the concept of perceptual beliefs.

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“…For decades, amodal completion has been primarily considered to be a visual phenomenon, and amodal completion indeed plays an important role in the visual sense modality, where it comprises the representation of occluded parts of objects we see. To use the go-to example of visual amodal completion, when we see a cat behind a picket fence, our perceptual system represents those parts of the cat that are occluded by the fence (see Michotte et al 1964 andKanizsa andGerbino 1982 for classic studies and Nanay 2010, 2018b, Briscoe 2011, and Helton and Nanay 2019 for philosophical overviews).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To use the go‐to example of visual amodal completion, when we see a cat behind a picket fence, our perceptual system represents those parts of the cat that are occluded by the fence (see Michotte et al . 1964 and Kanizsa and Gerbino 1982 for classic studies and Nanay 2010, 2018b, Briscoe 2011, and Helton and Nanay 2019 for philosophical overviews).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Olfactory Amodal Completion

Young

Nánay

2021

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Amodal completion is the representation of those parts of the perceived object that we get no sensory stimulation from. While amodal completion is rife and plays an essential role in all sense modalities, philosophical discussions of this phenomenon have almost entirely been limited to vision. The aim of this paper is to examine in what sense we can talk about amodal completion in olfaction. We distinguish three different senses of amodal completionspatial, temporal, and feature-based completionand argue that all three are present and play a significant role in olfaction.

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Amodal completion and knowledge

Cited by 6 publications

References 25 publications

Hot-cold empathy gaps and the grounds of authenticity

Hot-cold empathy gaps and the grounds of authenticity

Against the very idea of a perceptual belief

Olfactory Amodal Completion

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