An Absolutist Theory of Faultless Disagreement in Aesthetics

Abstract

Some philosophers writing on the possibility of faultless disagreement have argued that the only way to account for the intuition that there could be disagreements which are faultless in every sense is to accept a relativistic semantics.In this article we demonstrate that this view is mistaken by constructing an absolutist semantics for a particular domain -aesthetic discourse -which allows for the possibility of genuinely faultless disagreements. We argue that this position (Humean absolutism) is an improvement over previous absolutist responses to the relativist's challenge and that it presents an independently plausible account of the semantics of aesthetic discourse.In recent years philosophers have paid a great deal of attention to the putative phenomenon of faultless disagreement. Some have argued that there are certain domains in which there are (or at least could be) instances of genuine disagreement in which neither party is (in some important sense we will explicate later) at fault.1 Popular candidate domains include disagreements concerning ethics and aesthetics, those involving epistemic modals (e.g. 'he might be in the car'), and, perhaps most prominently debates surrounding so called 'predicates of personal taste' such as 'fun' and 'tasty'. Such claims are, of course, controversial and some have expressed scepticism as to whether there could ever be disagreements which are faultless in any theoretically interesting sense.2 Others, though, have not only accepted these appearances at face value but have put them to work in the service of various theoretical goals, invoking the phenomenon of faultless disagreement as, among other things, a mandate for endorsing relativistic semantic theories. In this article we will have very little to say concerning the general debate over whether faultless disagreement -in the sense we will explicate belowis, or even could be, a genuine phenomenon. (Though we hope that the view we sketch will address some reservations which might arise regarding the phenomenon.) Rather we will focus on the claimed link between faultless disagreement and relativism. Arguing that, appearances to the contrary, an attractive non-relativist theory can be sketched which captures both the intuition that the disputes in question are genuine disagreements and the intuition that they are completely faultless. 4 Further, we will not attempt to establish that the view we will outline below provides the correct account of the semantics of the relevant disputes but merely argue that it manages to present an independently plausible non-relativist account of the semantics while also capturing the alleged phenomenon of faultless disagreement. Since the view of faultless disagreement we sketch below takes its inspiration from some of Hume's work in aesthetics our discussion will primarily focus on disputes concerning matters of aesthetic taste but the lessons we will draw are intended to be equally applicable to disputes in other domains where faultless disagreement may be present.In §1 we...

An Analysis of the Centrality of Intuition Talk in the Discussion on Taste Disagreements

“…The twenty papers from the 2011-2020 decade are: Baker, Robson (2015), Capraru (2016), Carter (2014), Clapp (2015), Cohnitz, Marques (2014), Colomina-Almiñana (2015), Díaz (2016), Egan (2014), Eriksson, Tiozzo (2016), Hales (2014), Hîncu (2015), Huvenes (2014), Kompa (2015), Lasersohn (2011), López de Sa (2015), Miščević (2018), Moltmann (2012), Odrowąż-Sypniewska (2013), Palmira (2014), andStojanovic (2012).…”

Omni-beauty as a divine attribute

“…Various philosophers have recently argued that there are certain instances within aesthetics – as well as in other areas such as discussions concerning so called ‘predicates of personal taste’ – where there can be disagreements which are faultless in every sense 20 . For disagreements of this kind to exist it would be required not only that ‘both subjects have exhausted their epistemic responsibilities towards their respective beliefs’ (Baker & Robson (2017), 434) but also that the apparently conflicting propositions which each party believes are both true (or, at a minimum, both not false) 21 . As such, someone can reason perfectly, on the basis of the evidence available to her, but still arrive at a judgement which is not faultless in this sense.…”

“…21.Baker and Robson (2017) propose a view of faultless disagreement in aesthetics according to which both parties believe claims which are, strictly speaking, neither true nor false.…”

Predicates of personal taste and normative meaning

“…One of the latest important additions to this tradition is perhapsSinclair (2021) Stevenson (1937). is a classical predecessor of modern expressivism regarding ethical terms.15 Versions of taste absolutism, broadly understood, were proposed by, e.g.,Hirvonen (2016) andWyatt (2018); see alsoBaker & Robson (2017) andSchafer (2011) who developed versions of aesthetic absolutism. Wyatt's theory was recently criticized by Hîncu & Zeman (2021) andZouhar (2020).16 Versions of taste contextualism, broadly understood, were proposed by, e.g.,Barker (2013),Buekens (2011), Cappelen & Hawthorne (2009), Glanzberg (2007,Huvenes (2014),Karczewska (2021), López de Sa (2008,Marques (2015),Marques & García-Carpintero (2014),Plunkett & Sundell (2013),Recanati (2007),Silk (2016),Stojanovic (2007),Sundell (2011), Zakkou (2019a2019b), and Zouhar (2018).…”