An account of truthmaking

Saenz, Noël Blas

doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1894-5

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Does this mean that truth and its truthmaker should always have the same structure? Although some truthmaker theorists have suggested that there should be a full match between truth and its truthmaker (see (Saenz, 2020, 3425)), this does not seem to be true. It is intuitively plausible that propositions with different structures might have the same truthmaker.…”

Section: The Disjunction Thesis and The Truthmakers Of Negative Truthsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The disjunction thesis and necessary connection

Mohsen

2022

Philosophical Books

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Section: The Disjunction Thesis and The Truthmakers Of Negative Truthsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The disjunction thesis and necessary connection

Mohsen

2022

Philosophical Books

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“…These non-maximalists believe that some truths are true in virtue of standing in a relation of truthmaking to some entity and that others are true simply because they lack a falsemaker. It seems that these sorts of propositions are true in quite different ways, a point recognized by Saenz (2020: 3430ff.) and Barker and Jago (2012: 136).…”

Section: Default Truth-valuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

True by Default

Griffith¹

2021

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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This paper defends a new version of truthmaker non-maximalism. The central feature of the view is the notion of a default truth-value. I offer a novel explanation for default truth-values and use it to motivate a general approach to the relation between truth-value and ontology, which I call truth-value-maker theory. According to this view, some propositions are false unless made true, whereas others are true unless made false. A consequence of the theory is that negative existential truths need no truthmakers and that positive existential falsehoods need no falsemakers.

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“…Compare the proposal in Saenz (2020). Saenz proposes that the truth of a proposition is grounded in the fact with which it deeply corresponds, which in the case of something like <Fa> is the conjunctive fact ['a' denotes a, 'is F' predicates F-ness, and a is F].…”

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confidence: 98%

Why Truthmaking Is Not a Case of Grounding

Audi

2019

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Truthmaker theorists often express their core commitment by saying that truth is grounded in being, and grounding theorists often take truthmaking to be a paradigm case of grounding. But I will argue that truthmaking is not a case of grounding. What is crucial for understanding truthmaking is not grounding but rather meaning (in a broad sense including reference). Truth is still constrained by how things are, so even if (socalled) truthmakers don't play a role in grounding truths, the methodological program of truthmaker theory survives. Here I lay out my understanding of truth and truthmaking, and distinguish two conceptions of grounding. I argue that truthmaking is not plausibly seen as a case of grounding on either conception. I argue further that treating truthmaking as grounding threatens to violate a plausible irreflexivity principle, and makes trouble for the view that grounding is transitive. I then suggest that there is no genuine relation of truthmaking (which there would have to be if it were a true case of grounding). Finally, I show how the core insights of truthmaker theory are preserved by the understanding of truthmaking that I favor.

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An account of truthmaking

Cited by 6 publications

References 57 publications

The disjunction thesis and necessary connection

The disjunction thesis and necessary connection

True by Default

Why Truthmaking Is Not a Case of Grounding

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