An Alternative Algorithm for Identifying Free Riders Based on a No-Free-Rider Nash Equilibrium

Existence, Uniqueness, and Algorithm for Identifying Free Riders in Multiple Public Good Games: Replacement Function Approach

“…Recognizing the significance of identifying free riders, several authors, such as Bergstrom et al (1986), Andreoni and McGuire (1993), Shrestha and Cheong (2007), and Yildirim (2014), provide algorithms for identifying free riders. Miyakoshi and Suzuki (2012) use Cornes and Hartley's (2007) replacement function to construct an algorithm for identifying the contributors to a single public good.…”

“…In this study, we focus on how to identify free riders in multiple public goods models. Bergstrom et al (1986), Andreoni and McGuire (1993), Shrestha and Cheong (2007), and Yildirim (2014) develop an algorithm that can identify who is a non-contributor (i.e., free rider) or a contributor in a Nash equilibrium of the voluntary provision model given knowledge of the incomes and preferences of all individuals. These authors' algorithms are valid only in the model of a single voluntarily supplied public good.…”