An alternative characterization of the uniform rule

Ching, Stephen

doi:10.1007/bf00179209

Cited by 97 publications

(79 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Sprumont (1991) started a long list of axiomatic characterizations of the uniform rule by showing …rst that it is the unique e¢ cient, strategy-proof and anonymous rule, and second that anonymity in this characterization can be replaced by envy-freeness. Ching (1994) strengthens the results of Sprumont (1991) by showing that the uniform rule is the only one satisfying e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness and equal treatment of equals. Ching (1992), Dagan (1996), Schummer and Thomson (1997), Sönmez (1994), and Thomson (1994aThomson ( , 1994bThomson ( , 1995Thomson ( , and 1997 contain alternative characterizations of the uniform rule in the division problem.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 63%

“…In Theorem 1 we show that in the subclass of division problems under constraints with the property that the full set of agents is admissible, the feasible uniform rule is the unique rule satisfying e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, and bound monotonicity. This result is an extension of the characterization of Ching (1994) for the uniform rule in the classical division problem. The feasible uniform rule on this subclass of division problems under constraints tries to allocate the good among all agents in the most egalitarian way respecting not only the bounds imposed by e¢ ciency, but also those imposed by the feasibility constraints.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 64%

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The division problem under constraints

Bergantiños¹,

Massó²,

Neme³

2015

Games and Economic Behavior

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The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with singlepeaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended uniform rules proposed to solve the division problem under constraints. Rules in this family extend the uniform rule used to solve the classical division problem without constraints. We show that the family of all extended uniform rules coincides with the set of rules satisfying e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coalitions.Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Number: D71.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 63%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 64%

The division problem under constraints

Bergantiños¹,

Massó²,

Neme³

2015

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…In this setting the uniform rule has emerged as the most appealing one. 5 At each division problem with compulsory participation the uniform rule tries to allocate the amount of the good among all agents as equally as possible, keeping the e¢ ciency constraints binding. Hence, all agents are constrained in the same way; i.e., either each receives a share below his peak (when the sum of all their ideals is larger than the total amount) or each agent receives a share above his peak (when the sum of all their ideals is smaller than the total amount).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The division problem with voluntary participation

2011

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The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will …nd acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this paper we consider the division problem when agents'participation is voluntary. Each agent has an acceptable interval of shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent either an acceptable share or the zero share because otherwise, he would prefer to exclude himself and leave with the zero share; this would require to reassign the remaining agents'shares. We study a subclass of e¢ cient and consistent rules and characterize extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agents'voluntary participation.We thank Bettina Klaus for helpful comments.

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“…He established that this rule is the only rule that is strategy-proof, anonymous, and Pareto-efficient. Ching [6] reinforced this result by replacing anonymity by symmetry. He proved that the uniform rule is the only rule that satisfies strategy- 1 The examination of the link between strategy-proofness and efficiency begins with Hurwicz [18] who studied the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions in classical exchange economies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 86%

Strategy Proofness and Unanimity in Private Good Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences

2015

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In this paper we establish the link between strategy-proofness and unanimity in a domain of private good economies with single-peaked preferences. We introduce a new condition and we prove that if this new property together with the requirement of citizen sovereignty are held, a social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if it is unanimous. As an implication, we show that strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity become equivalent. We also give applications to implementation literature: We provide a full characterization for standard Nash implementation and partially honest Nash implementation and we determine a certain equivalence among these theories.

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An alternative characterization of the uniform rule

Cited by 97 publications

References 6 publications

The division problem under constraints

The division problem under constraints

The division problem with voluntary participation

Strategy Proofness and Unanimity in Private Good Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences

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