An analysis of economic incentives to encourage organ donation: evidence from Chile

Abstract

Advances in medical technology have made organ transplants one of the best health treatment alternatives for several diseases, generating a significant increase in organ demand. However, the supply of organs, both from living or postmortem donors, has not increased at the same rate (Howard 2007). Policy makers have suggested different strategies for increasing organ donation, including the introduction of financial and monetary incentives (Stoler et al. 2017). The scarcity of organs for transplantation is a worldwide problem. In the United States, 10,000 people die every year while waiting for an organ, and the median waiting time goes from 2 to 6 years (Beard et al. 2013; Roth et al. 2005). In Western Europe, approximately 40,000 patients are waiting for an organ (Mossialos et al. 2008). Developed countries tend to have higher cadaveric donation rates than developing countries, while, the reverse is true for living donation (International Registry in Organ Donation and Transplantation 2017). Based on the discussion on incentivizing organ donation using financial mechanisms, this paper performs a cost-benefit analysis on the introduction of monetary incentives for living kidney donations in a developing country. We consider the case for Chile,

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“…Because of this, it may become more challenging to receive organs on time for transplantation purposes. Previous studies have questioned whether presumptive consent is an ethically acceptable method of obtaining organs for transplant (Prabhu, 2019), as well as the opt-out and opt-in consent system for deceased organ donation (Ahmad et al , 2019). In some developing nations, such as SSA countries, where there is no robust system or policy governing organ transplantation, it can be challenging to obtain the consent of a potential organ donor.…”

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“…Currently, there is not a large income gap between donors and recipients in the US (Gill et al, 2012). Nevertheless, studies suggest that -at a given price -the poor would have larger incentives to donate and thus are more exposed to potential risks (Moniruzzaman, 2012;Parada-Contzen and Vásquez-Lavín, 2019). 6 Typically, there is a trade-off between repugnance and efficiency.…”