An Analysis of SEC Guidelines for Executing Open Market Repurchases*

Cook, Douglas O.; Krigman, Laurie; Leach, John

doi:10.1086/367751

Cited by 77 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…These results can be compared to the findings of Cook, Krigman and Leach (2003), who report that 40.74% of the firms in their sample exceed the legal volume on at least one occasion. The frequency of violation is higher on the Nasdaq than on the NYSE.…”

Section: Compliance With Volume Regulationsmentioning

confidence: 78%

“…On the NYSE, violations represent 14% of allowed volume whereas on the Nasdaq, firms repurchase 57% more than the allowed non-block volume for a day. Although the Cook, Krigman and Leach's (2003) results are based on a questionnaire that was answered on a voluntary basis, they find that the non-compliance rate is high. Using data from the French market, we show that the non-compliance rate is considerably higher than their estimate.…”

Section: Compliance With Volume Regulationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is commonly believed by traders, the SEC, and the stock exchanges that the safe harbor rule is followed by most repurchasing firms (Cook, Krigman and Leach, 2003).…”

Section: Repurchase Regulation Environmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Prior to December 2003, when the SEC adopted amendments to Rule 10b-18, requiring companies to disclose all repurchases, the SEC had no means of investigating 10b-18 compliance for U.S. firms. Given the absence of regulatory based data, Cook, Krigman and Leach (2003) investigate 10b-18 compliance by using voluntarily disclosed data for 54 firms' repurchase programs during 1993 and 1994. They document that only 2 of the 54 firms were verifiably in compliance with the safe harbor guidelines for all reported repurchases.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Share repurchase regulations: Do firms play by the rules?

Ginglinger

Hamon

2009

International Review of Law and Economics

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Open market share repurchases are strictly regulated to prevent companies from profiting from insider information. We examine compliance with these rules in France, where the mandatory disclosure of share repurchases provides detailed information on repurchases actually undertaken. Using a database containing 36,848 repurchases made by 352 French firms over the period 2000-2002, we show that very few firms fully comply with the regulations for all their buybacks. Non-compliance has an adverse effect on liquidity only for the smallest and least liquid firms.a Both authors are from DRM-Cereg, University Paris-Dauphine, place du Maréchal de Lattre, 75775 -Paris cedex 16 -edith.ginglinger@dauphine.fr (corresponding author), jacques.hamon@dauphine.fr. We are grateful to Gérard Rameix for providing the data about daily repurchases. We would also like to thank Myron Slovin and Marie Sushka for their comments.2

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Section: Compliance With Volume Regulationsmentioning

confidence: 78%

Section: Compliance With Volume Regulationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is commonly believed by traders, the SEC, and the stock exchanges that the safe harbor rule is followed by most repurchasing firms (Cook, Krigman and Leach, 2003).…”

Section: Repurchase Regulation Environmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Share repurchase regulations: Do firms play by the rules?

Ginglinger

Hamon

2009

International Review of Law and Economics

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“…For information, the link between repurchases on the market and the liquidity of the company's securities was recently the subject of several studies (Brockman and Chung, 2001;Cook andHamon., 2006) . The latest study was carried out on the French market.…”

Section: The Liquidity Of the Company's Securities Before The Offermentioning

confidence: 99%

The Public Stock Buyback Tender Offer in France

Khiari¹,

Mellouli²

2017

ABR

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This article focuses on the public stock buyback tender offers carried out in France between 1996 and 2005. First, we will study the impact of The Public Stock Buyback Tender Offers' announcements on stock prices. The results of the event studies show that these announcements are welcomed by a very favorable price reaction. Secondly, we try to explain the premium in the repurchase mode. The results of the linear regressions show that a low level of liquidity and the securities' performance, during the period preceding the public stock buyback tender offer, seems to push companies to pay large premiums. It also appears from these regressions that smaller companies, accepting the over demand and for a significant percentage from the capital; are also encouraged to offer high premiums.

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Cross-sectional differences in the liquidity effects of open market share repurchases

Kim

2005

J Econ Finan

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An Analysis of SEC Guidelines for Executing Open Market Repurchases*

Cited by 77 publications

References 5 publications

Share repurchase regulations: Do firms play by the rules?

Share repurchase regulations: Do firms play by the rules?

The Public Stock Buyback Tender Offer in France

Cross-sectional differences in the liquidity effects of open market share repurchases

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