DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-69293-5_47
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An Analysis of the Manufacturing Messaging Specification Protocol

Abstract: Abstract. The Manufacturing Messaging Specification (MMS) protocol is widely used in industrial process control applications, but it is poorly documented. In this paper we present an analysis of the MMS protocol in order to improve understanding of MMS in the context of information security. Our findings show that MMS has insufficient security mechanisms, and the meagre security mechanisms that are available are not implemented in commercially available industrial devices.

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Cited by 14 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Lastly, the state manager updates the states of the protected devices. In order to evaluate their framework, the authors applied their stateful analysis plugin in a scenario which utilizes the Manufacturing Message Specifications (MMS) [141] protocol based on the directions of IEC 61850 [41], [42] standard. They described two attack examples that are detected successfully, but they do not provide numerical results.…”
Section: Idps Systems For Substationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Lastly, the state manager updates the states of the protected devices. In order to evaluate their framework, the authors applied their stateful analysis plugin in a scenario which utilizes the Manufacturing Message Specifications (MMS) [141] protocol based on the directions of IEC 61850 [41], [42] standard. They described two attack examples that are detected successfully, but they do not provide numerical results.…”
Section: Idps Systems For Substationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This work [142] analyzes a specification-based IDS which is deployed in a substation in South Korea. More specifically, their IDS is based on the analysis of Generic Object Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE) [143] and MMS [141] protocols, examining general network traffic characteristics, such as the number of bits per second (bps), the number of packets per second (pps) and the number of connections per second (cps). For the mentioned characteristics, specific intrusion detection algorithms were created utilizing statistical analysis techniques.…”
Section: Idps Systems For Substationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These models are mapped, at the station level, to ISO/OSI-like protocol stack based on the Manufacturing Message Specification (ISO 9506 MMS) on top of TCP/IP. MMS was developed for exchanging real-time data and perform supervisory control between networked devices and computer applications in a vendor neutral and application independent manner [63]. Therefore, the protocols and information model described in IEC 61850 have the potential to be used to integrate EMS applications, although this type of integration have not been mentioned in any of the studies we have reviewed.…”
Section: ) Integration With Scada/emsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the other side, an ABB SCADA Server located in the supervisory network, pulls data from the mentioned PLC. ABB devices communicate with each other by default using the Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) protocol [17]. In the middle of the link between the SCADA Server and the OpenFlow switch, an Ubuntu machine has been set with the purpose of performing a transparent Man in The Middle (MITM) attack using two bridged Ethernet ports and capturing traffic with an application based on Scapy [18].…”
Section: Experimental Set Upmentioning
confidence: 99%