An Analytical Study of a Two-Sided Mobility Game

Chremos, Ioannis Vasileios; Malikopoulos, Andreas A.

doi:10.23919/acc53348.2022.9867492

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…To understand the innate competition over the scarce resources in transportation and the impact of congestion, pricing game theory has been one of the standard tools that can help us investigate the impact of selfishness and traffic efficiency [27,28]. By adopting a game-theoretic approach, advanced systems have been proposed to assign travelers concrete routes or minimize all travelers' travel time while studying the system's Nash equilibrium (NE) under different mechanisms of congestion pricing [29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37]. Key theoretical games used for this approach include routing/congestion games [14,[38][39][40][41], which are a generalization of the standard resource-sharing game of an arbitrary number of resources in a network with a finite number of travelers.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A traveler-centric mobility game: Efficiency and stability under rationality and prospect theory

Chremos

Malikopoulos

2023

PLoS ONE

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, we study a routing and travel-mode choice problem for mobility systems with a multimodal transportation network as a “mobility game” with coupled action sets. We formulate an atomic routing game to focus on the travelers’ preferences and study the impact on the efficiency of the travelers’ behavioral decision-making under rationality and prospect theory. To control the innate inefficiencies, we introduce a mobility “pricing mechanism,” in which we model traffic congestion using linear cost functions while also considering the waiting times at different transport hubs. We show that the travelers’ selfish actions lead to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We then perform a Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability analysis to establish that the mobility system’s inefficiencies remain relatively low and the social welfare at a NE remains close to the social optimum as the number of travelers increases. We deviate from the standard game-theoretic analysis of decision-making by extending our mobility game to capture the subjective behavior of travelers using prospect theory. Finally, we provide a detailed discussion of implementing our proposed mobility game.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A traveler-centric mobility game: Efficiency and stability under rationality and prospect theory

Chremos

Malikopoulos

2023

PLoS ONE

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Game theory has also been leveraged for policy-making, for instance for designing pricing strategies for MSPs [19]- [22], incentives and tolls to regulate congested networks [23]- [27], analysis of interactions between authorities and MSPs [28]- [32], and between MSPs and users [33], [34]. While [19], [20], [35] focus on pricing strategies for MSPs at the network level, [21], [22] leverage game theory to study management and subsidies of fleets of shared electric vehicles. Game-theoretic approaches to regulate congestion leveraging particular policies have been studied in [23]- [25], via optimized routing and pricing in [26], and via tolling policies in [27].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Interactions in Multi-Modal Mobility Systems: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

Zardini,

Lanzetti,

Belgioioso

et al. 2023

2023 IEEE 26th International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The evolution of existing transportation systems, mainly driven by urbanization and increased availability of mobility options, such as private, profit-maximizing ride-hailing companies, calls for tools to reason about their design and regulation. To study this complex socio-technical problem, one needs to account for the strategic interactions of the heterogeneous stakeholders involved in the mobility ecosystem and analyze how they influence the system. In this paper, we focus on the interactions between citizens who compete for the limited resources of a mobility system to complete their desired trip. Specifically, we present a game-theoretic framework for multi-modal mobility systems, where citizens, characterized by heterogeneous preferences, have access to various mobility options and seek individually-optimal decisions. We study the arising game and prove the existence of an equilibrium, which can be efficiently computed via a convex optimization problem. Through both an analytical and a numerical case study for the classic scenario of Sioux Falls, USA, we illustrate the capabilities of our model and perform sensitivity analyses. Importantly, we show how to embed our framework into a "larger" game among stakeholders of the mobility ecosystem (e.g., municipality, Mobility Service Providers (MSPs), and citizens), effectively giving rise to tools to inform strategic interventions and policy-making in the mobility ecosystem.

show abstract

A Control Framework for Socially Optimal Emerging Mobility Systems

Malikopoulos

2024

Springer Tracts on Transportation and Traffic

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

An Analytical Study of a Two-Sided Mobility Game

Cited by 6 publications

References 21 publications

A traveler-centric mobility game: Efficiency and stability under rationality and prospect theory

A traveler-centric mobility game: Efficiency and stability under rationality and prospect theory

Strategic Interactions in Multi-Modal Mobility Systems: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

A Control Framework for Socially Optimal Emerging Mobility Systems

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About