An answer to Lucretius' symmetry argument against the fear of death

Kaufman, Frederik

doi:10.1007/bf01079063

Cited by 26 publications

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“…14. Belshaw (2000), Kaufman (1995;1996;1999;, and Nagel (1979) defend or express sympathy for versions of the impossibility solution.…”

Section: The Wish Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are, 2. Writings at least partly on Lucretius' Puzzle include Belshaw (2000), Brueckner and Fischer (1986;1993;, Deng (2015), Feldman (1991), Finocchiaro and Sullivan (2016), Harman (2011), Johansson (2013), Kamm (1993: Chapters 2-4), Kaufman (1995;1996;1999;, McMahan (2006), Meier (2019), Nagel (1979;1986: 223-31), Rosenbaum (1989), Sorensen (2013), and Timmerman (2018). I am gliding over a complication: Some of these writers treat Lucretius' Puzzle as the question whether it is the case that earlier-rather-than-later death can be bad for one but later-ratherthan-earlier creation cannot be bad for one.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Lucretian Puzzles

Rabenberg

2021

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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It seems that people typically prefer dying later to dying earlier. It also seems that people typically do not prefer having been created earlier to having been created later. Lucretius’ Puzzle is the question whether anything typically rationally recommends having a preference for dying later to dying earlier over having a preference for having been created earlier to having been created later. In this paper, I distinguish among three ways in which Lucretius’ Puzzle can be understood and say how I think they ought to be answered.

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“…14. Belshaw (2000), Kaufman (1995;1996;1999;, and Nagel (1979) defend or express sympathy for versions of the impossibility solution.…”

Section: The Wish Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lucretian Puzzles

Rabenberg

2021

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…The thin self, on the other hand, refers to a person "shorn of [the aforementioned] thick traits such that all that remains is one's metaphysical essence." 5 The identity account does not object to the view that thin persons could have possibly begun to exist earlier than they in 4 See Kaufman, 1995Kaufman, , 1996Kaufman, , 1999Kaufman, , 2000Kaufman, , 2011Belshaw, 1993Belshaw, , 1998Belshaw, , 2000. Sometimes Belshaw seems more interested in expounding on people's asymmetrical attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous nonexistence as opposed to the asymmetry itself.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lucretian Symmetry and the Content-Based Approach

2021

Philosophia

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In addressing the Lucretian symmetry problem, the content-based approach attends to the difference between the contents of the actual life and those of relevant possible lives of a person. According to this approach, the contents of a life with an earlier beginning would substantially differ from, and thus be discontinuous with, the contents of the actual life, whereas the contents of a life with the same beginning but a later death would be continuous with the contents of the actual life. In this paper, I examine two versions of the content-based approach: the identity account and the preference account. The identity account holds that, in the sense of identity which is relevant to the evil of nonexistence, the subject of the actual life, though identical to the person in the life with a later death, is distinct from the subject of the life with an earlier beginning. The preference account maintains that, given one's attachments to actual particulars, a life with an earlier beginning is not rationally preferable to one's actual life, whereas a life with a later death is. I argue that each version of the content-based approach is implausible, while discussing some of the complications that face each of them.

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“… 14 The main criticisms posed against Deprivationism and LCA are The Timing Problem and The Asymmetry Problem. For discussion on these, see Johansson ( 2013a , 2013b ), Kaufman ( 1995 ), Lucretius ( 1940 ), Nagel ( 1970 ). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Severity and death

Ehlert

2024

Med Health Care and Philos

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This article discusses the relationship between two theories about the badness of death, the Life-Comparative Account and the Gradualist Account, and two methods of operationalizing severity in health care priority setting, Absolute Shortfall and Proportional Shortfall. The aim is that theories about the badness of death can influence and inform the idea of the basis of severity as a priority setting criterion. I argue that there are strong similarities between the Life-Comparative Account and Absolute Shortfall, and since the Life-Comparative Account is one of the most reasonable accounts of the badness of death, this provides some support for using Absolute Shortfall. I also argue that it is difficult to find support for Proportional Shortfall from theories about the badness of death, and also, that it is difficult to find support for Gradualist Account from theories about severity.

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An answer to Lucretius' symmetry argument against the fear of death

Cited by 26 publications

References 0 publications

Lucretian Puzzles

Lucretian Puzzles

Lucretian Symmetry and the Content-Based Approach

Severity and death

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