An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals

Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts

“…38 See Hong and Shum (2003) and Heumann (2019) for interdependent values models involving a Gaussian information structure and with respectively single-dimensional and multi-dimensional signals. Relatedly, Weiergraeber and Wolf (2018) develop an empirical analysis of a generalization of Goeree and Offerman (2003)'s model but without any formal guarantees regarding identification.…”

Projection of Private Values in Auctions

“…In terms of expected revenue, with rational bidders revenue equivalence holds because their strategies depend solely on their aggregate types, which are independent across players. As noted above, however, a taste-projecting player's bidding behavior cannot be described in terms of a unidimensional statistic; this introduces familiar challenges for attempting to rank auction formats in the presence of multi-dimensional types (see, e.g., Che and Gale, 2006;Fang and Morris, 2006;Heumann, 2019). Nonetheless, we conjecture that the first-price auction yields a higher expected revenue with projection because of the competition effect, which is absent in second-price and English auctions.…”