An Auction-Bargaining Model for Initial Emission Permits

Ding, Lili; Wang, Xiaoling; Kang, Wei

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-07956-1_30

Cited by 1 publication

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References 14 publications

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“…Sun et al [6] generalize the setting by considering the multi-buyer and multi-seller scenario and design a double action for green certificate allocation. Ding et al [12] consider the influence of the interactions between the energy consumption market and the certificate auction market and design a two-stage auctionbargaining model. Wang et al [13] design the multi-unit auction in the Bayesian framework.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal green certificate auction design embedding economic dispatch

Wang

2022

Proceedings of the Thirteenth ACM International Conference on Future Energy Systems

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The rapid development of carbon capture technology speeds up its industrialization and wide application with the help of massive investment. In addition to the capital market, such investment may also come from a well-designed carbon market. This paper proposes a green certificate auction to maximize the auction revenue for enabling the carbon capture technology. Besides political and regulatory requirements, the goodwill from contributing to carbon neutrality may also incentivize the generating companies to participate. The auction design is challenging as it associates with the economic dispatch procedure in the electricity market. Using the notion of virtual demand, we decouple the auction from economic dispatch, and we prove that our designed auction enjoys optimality, truthfulness, and individual rationality. We also show that our auction can be extended to the multi-period scenario, highlighting the impact of leftover certificates. We further provide an upper bound for sample complexity when the willingness of participants cannot be well-identified. Numerical studies verify the effectiveness of the proposed auction and the tightness of the derived sample complexity bound. CCS CONCEPTS• Applied computing → Multi-criterion optimization and decisionmaking.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal green certificate auction design embedding economic dispatch

Wang

2022

Proceedings of the Thirteenth ACM International Conference on Future Energy Systems

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

An Auction-Bargaining Model for Initial Emission Permits

Cited by 1 publication

References 14 publications

Optimal green certificate auction design embedding economic dispatch

Optimal green certificate auction design embedding economic dispatch

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