An auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation over paths

Courcoubetis, Costas; Dramitinos, Manos; Stamoulis, George D.

doi:10.1016/s1388-3437(01)80200-6

Cited by 37 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…For a presentation of the theory of auctions, see [25] and [38]. For related models, see [11], [31] and [32].…”

Section: Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Models of Communication Networks

Walrand¹

2008

Performance Modeling and Engineering

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Standard performance evaluations of communication networks focus on the technology layer where protocols define precise rules of operations. Those studies assume a model of network utilization and of network characteristics and derive performance measures. However, performance affects how users utilize the network. Also, investments by network providers affect performance and consequently network utilization. We call the actions of users and network providers the "economic layer" of the network because their decisions depend largely on economic incentives. The economic and technology layers interact in a complex way and they should be studied together. This tutorial explores economic models of networks that combine the economic and technology layers. IntroductionWhy were QoS mechanisms for end users not implemented in the Internet? Should users have a choice of grade of service for different applications? Why is security of the Internet so poor? Should Internet service providers be allowed to charge content providers for transporting their traffic? Should cell phones be unlocked to work with multiple operators? Should municipalities deploy free Wi-Fi networks? How should different services of a WiMAX network be priced?These questions that affect the future of communication networks go beyond technology. However, their answers certainly depend on technological features. Different protocols enable or prevent choices of users and influence the revenue of operators and, consequently, their investment incentives. The engineers who define network protocols typically focus on their performance characteristics but are largely unaware of the market consequences of their designs.

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“…For a presentation of the theory of auctions, see [25] and [38]. For related models, see [11], [31] and [32].…”

Section: Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Models of Communication Networks

Walrand¹

2008

Performance Modeling and Engineering

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“…3 Thus, the percentages show that, given the network set ups in figure 3, the impact on the performance is affected more with a market failure, when there are fewer regions in the first instance. However, as already mentioned, the 4, 5 and 10 region set ups give better call success rates than the 20 region case at intermediate and heavier network loads.…”

Section: Average Call Success Rate With Failurementioning

confidence: 95%

Scalability and robustness of a network resource allocation system using market-based agents

2006

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“…Hence, it is not considered in this paper. Truthful bidding allows the bidders to bid their true valuation [11] while bid shading is a situation where some bidders lower their valuations in order to get some added advantage during the auction process [12]. The users in this paper value the radio spectrum in a similar way to that widely used in auction theory based models.…”

Section: The Bidding Price (Bp)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Energy Efficient Short Term Spectrum Auction Using the Concept of Green Payments

Oloyede

Grace

2016

Wireless Pers Commun

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This work seeks to demonstrate the economic importance of short-term spectrum auction and how it can be implemented with fewer overheads. This can be achieved using the proposed market driven sealed bid spectrum auction process with a novel concept called the green payment. The green payment serves as an incentive during the auction process to encourage the users to use the radio spectrum in an efficient manner. The model proposes to tax users that are not power efficient while those that are power efficient pay a subsidy during the auction process. First, the appropriate bidding and auction periods are examined and determined such that the bidding period is dependent on the traffic load in the system. Using the obtained bidding period, the value of the green payments is then examined and the appropriate level of tax and subsidy are also determined. The economic importance of the model in terms of the revenue generation for the service provider and in terms of the tax being adequate to finance the subsidy is also examined. These results show that using the proposed concept of green payment, the energy consumed and the system delay can be reduced when compared to a non-green payment based auction process. The results also show that the proposed model is beneficial to the service provider in terms of increase in profit and that the tax and subsidy system is self-sustaining.

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An auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation over paths

Cited by 37 publications

References 2 publications

Economic Models of Communication Networks

Economic Models of Communication Networks

Scalability and robustness of a network resource allocation system using market-based agents

Energy Efficient Short Term Spectrum Auction Using the Concept of Green Payments

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