2005
DOI: 10.1016/j.entcs.2005.06.005
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An Automata Based Approach for Verifying Information Flow Properties

Abstract: We present an automated verification technique to verify trace based information flow properties for finite state systems. We show that the Basic Security Predicates (BSPs) defined by Mantel in [5], which are shown to be the building blocks of known trace based information flow properties, can be characterised in terms of regularity preserving language theoretic operations. This leads to a decision procedure for checking whether a finite state system satisfies a given BSP. Verification techniques in the litera… Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…We also note that if the property WNI were expressible as a Boolean combination of BSPs, the decision procedure for model-checking BSPs for finite-state systems in [9] would imply that model-checking WNI for finite-state systems is decidable. Hence we can conclude that:…”
Section: Theorem 6 the Problem Of Model-checking The Property Wni Fomentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We also note that if the property WNI were expressible as a Boolean combination of BSPs, the decision procedure for model-checking BSPs for finite-state systems in [9] would imply that model-checking WNI for finite-state systems is decidable. Hence we can conclude that:…”
Section: Theorem 6 the Problem Of Model-checking The Property Wni Fomentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The complexity of verifying these basic properties has been studied [22]. A few works have considered richer systems models than finite state systems, e.g.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Union(s · a, t · a) ; 22 if obs u (s · a) = obs u (t · a) then 23 return compute-witness(s · a, t · a, , ) ; 24 return "secure" add ((s · a, t · a), (s, t), (a, a)) to store; 23 insert (s · a, t · a) into the list P ;…”
unclassified
“…In [9] the authors consider the complexity of many non-interference verification problems but synthesis is not addressed. In [10] an exponential time decision procedure for checking whether a finite state system satisfies a given Basic − → q, and iv) time continuity:…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%