A central decision maker allocates resources to each of n players who derive utility from their allocation. Consequently, her actions may be viewed as choosing an allocation of utilities u = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n ) from some set of feasible allocations U ∈ R n + . Consider a decision maker that chooses an allocation u ∈ U to maximizeThe above family of objective functions proposed originally by Atkinson and parameterized by α ∈ R + , permits the decision maker to tradeoff efficiency (by lowering α) for fairness (by increasing α). The family of Atkinson utility functions is canonical in that it captures the efficient or "utilitarian" allocation (α = 0), the "max-min" fair allocation (α → ∞), and the proprotionally fair (or Nash bargaining) allocation (α → 1).This paper characterizes the tradeoff between efficiency and fairness in this general setting. In particular, we demonstrate that under reasonable assumptions on U , the total utility to players under a fair allocation, FAIR(U, α), and the total utility to players under a perfectly efficient allocation, FAIR(U, 0) SYSTEM(U ), must satisfy, and moreover, that this bound is essentially tight.