2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2016.10.011
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An economic explanation of the nationalization of electoral politics

Abstract: The literature on the nationalization of electoral politics focuses on the institutional characteristics of political regimes and the structure and organization of social cleavages. We argue that the nationalization of electoral politics is also driven by economic performance. Short-term economic perturbations increase vote transfers from large (and highly nationalized) parties to small (and weakly nationalized) parties. On the contrary, sharp improvements in economic performance may generate vote shifts towar… Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…If anything, the interactions in our models are consistent in their sign, pointing out that the latter mechanism might be stronger. This is the argument developed in recent research by Lago and Lago Peñas (), who claim that the permeability of proportional electoral systems make small regionally based political parties more likely to emerge in periods of low economic growth. However, our results are far from significant, so we cannot conclude any clear differentiated effects of low economic growth under different types of electoral rules.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 83%
“…If anything, the interactions in our models are consistent in their sign, pointing out that the latter mechanism might be stronger. This is the argument developed in recent research by Lago and Lago Peñas (), who claim that the permeability of proportional electoral systems make small regionally based political parties more likely to emerge in periods of low economic growth. However, our results are far from significant, so we cannot conclude any clear differentiated effects of low economic growth under different types of electoral rules.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 83%
“…In the influential work by Caramani (2004), nationalisation refers to the territorial distribution of national parties' electoral offer and success (i.e., the demand side). Hence, nationalisation concerns the national actors' performance throughout the different constituencies of a given polity, which may vary depending on economic, institutional, or party-related factors (Bochsler, Mueller, and Bernauer 2016;Caramani 2004;Jones and Mainwaring 2003;Lago and Lago-Peñas 2016;Lago and Montero 2014).…”
Section: The Determinants Of Nationalisation Of Local Party Systemsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When the analysis is expanded over time and more elections are included, the problem is that the boundaries of the districts change, especially when using singlemember districts, and the number of parties entering the race is not constant. As support for new parties across districts is more heterogeneous than that of established parties (Jones and Mainwaring, 2003;Lago and Lago-Peñas 2016), the interpretation of electoral swings in the district vote is not straightforward.…”
Section: Aggregate-level Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%