An economic theory of the open shop trade union

Naylor, Robin; Cripps, Martin

doi:10.1016/0014-2921(93)90123-r

Cited by 64 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…The more freeriders there are, however, the less effective the union will be and the benefits of unionization will be eroded. One strand of research in this area has focused on this freerider aspect of covered nonmembers (Booth 19 85;Naylor 1989;Chaison and Dhavale 1992;Davis and Huston 1993;Naylor and Cripps 1993;Sobel 1995).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Explains Wage Differences between Union Members and Covered Nonmembers?

Schumacher¹

1999

Southern Economic Journal

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An individual covered by a collective bargaining agreement but who is not a union member is estimated to earn about 13% lower wages than a union member. Sectors with relatively few covered nonmembers are associated with a large coverage differential, while sectors with high proportions of covered nonmembers are associated with small differentials. This suggests free riders either weaken the bargaining position of the union or weak bargaining positions increase the incentive to freeride. Only a modest amount of this differential is accounted for by un measured ability, the probationary period associated with newly hired union workers, or union status misclassification.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Explains Wage Differences between Union Members and Covered Nonmembers?

Schumacher¹

1999

Southern Economic Journal

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“…1 The idea was taken up by Booth (1985) to rationalise union membership in a setting with homogeneous agents. Social custom models of trade 3 union membership with heterogeneous individuals have been presented by Booth and Chatterji (1993), Corneo (1993Corneo ( , 1995, Naylor and Cripps (1993), Raaum (1993), andGoerke (1997). Alternatively, Booth and Chatterji (1995), Moreton (1998Moreton ( , 1999, and Holmlund and Lundborg (1999) have assumed that the heterogeneity of individuals results from differential preferences over private goods.…”

Section: Determination Of Union Membership -A Review Of Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Norm-Based Trade Union Membership: Evidence for Germany

Goerke

Pannenberg

2004

German Economic Review

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent, nonprofit limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. The current research program deals with (1) mobility and flexibility of labor, (2) internationalization of labor markets, (3) welfare state and labor market, (4) labor markets in transition countries, (5) the future of labor, (6) evaluation of labor market policies and projects and (7) general labor economics. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available on the IZA website (www.iza.org) or directly from the author. In the absence of closed-shops and discriminatory wage policies, union membership can be explained by the existence of social norms. We describe a model, incorporating institutional features of the German labour market, which explicitly allows for social custom effects in the determination of union membership. Using panel data for Germany, we find evidence for according effects which restrict freeriding. The impact of social norms tends to increase with net union density. Hence, observed reductions in the demand for union membership can weaken the impact of a norm and accentuate the free-rider problem. for comments on a previous version of the paper, where we looked at cross-country differences between West Germany and the UK using cross sections of the GSOEP and the BHPS. All remaining errors are our responsibility.

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“…Within this framework, Naylor and Cripps (1993) costs, an increase in strike pay or an increase in individuals' sensitivity to the social custom of union membership and the associated solidarity effects. Extensions of the social custom model taking into account employer behaviour in form of management opposition to union membership have been proposed by Naylor and Raaum (1993) and -in a game-theoretic setting -by Corneo (1995).…”

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confidence: 99%