An ecumenical response to color contrast cases

Abstract

Intrapersonal variation due to color contrast effects has been used to argue against the following intuitive propositions about the colors: No object can be more than one determinable or determinate color of the same grade all over at the same time (Incompatibility); external objects are actually colored (Realism); and the colors of objects are mind-independent (Objectivism). In this article, I provide a defense of Incompatibility, Realism, and Objectivism from intrapersonal variation arguments that rely on color contrast effects. I provide a novel, ecumenical response to such arguments according to which typical variants are right, and which respects Incompatibility, Realism, and Objectivism, using the thesis that the colors of objects depend on the colors of objects in their surrounds.

Another look at color primitivism

“…For instance, there is room for an objective, relational ostensivism that respects color exclusion. What of a view which holds that the colors depend on the color(s) of the surround and the color(s) of the illuminate and not on minds (Roberts 2017)? Such a view would be a compromise between subjectivism and standard objectivism.…”