An Efficient Pseudonymous Authentication Scheme With Strong Privacy Preservation for Vehicular Communications

Abstract

Abstract-In this paper, we propose an efficient pseudonymous authentication scheme with strong privacy preservation, named PASS, for vehicular communications. Unlike traditional pseudonymous authentication schemes, the size of Certificate Revocation List (CRL) in PASS is linear with the number of revoked vehicles and irrelated to how many pseudonymous certificates are held by the revoked vehicles. PASS supports Roadside Unitsaided distributed certificate service that allows the vehicles to update certificates on road, but the service overhead is almost irrelated to the number of the updated certificates. Furthermore, PASS provides strong privacy preservation to the vehicles so that the adversaries can not trace any vehicle even all Roadside Units have been compromised. Extensive simulations demonstrate that PASS outperforms previously reported ones in terms of the revocation cost and the certificate updating overhead.

5G-VRSec: Secure Video Reporting Service in 5G Enabled Vehicular Networks

“…Then, the TA calculates its public key pub as pub = and distributes the parameters ( 1 , 2 , , , , pub , ℎ(⋅), (⋅), SEnc(⋅), Δ ) where SEnc(⋅) is a symmetric encryption function and Δ is the expiration threshold of a pseudonymous certificate. As well as the Eiza-Ni-Shi Scheme, the proposed solution also uses PASS (pseudonymous authentication scheme with strong privacy preservation) [8] to anonymously authenticate participating vehicles. Applying the concept proposed in [8], the trusted authority generates a private key SK TA and uses it to issue a set of pseudonymous certificates to those vehicles which expressed their willingness to participate in the video reporting service.…”

“…As well as the Eiza-Ni-Shi Scheme, the proposed solution also uses PASS (pseudonymous authentication scheme with strong privacy preservation) [8] to anonymously authenticate participating vehicles. Applying the concept proposed in [8], the trusted authority generates a private key SK TA and uses it to issue a set of pseudonymous certificates to those vehicles which expressed their willingness to participate in the video reporting service. The size of each pseudonymous certificate is 66 bytes: 21 bytes for the public key, 20 bytes for pseudo-identity, 4 bytes for the validity period, and 21 bytes for digital signature.…”

“…Cloud TA then generates a random nonce 10 and sends it to TA. Upon receiving the random nonce, TA generates its own random nonce 11 and a random symmetric key 8 , 8 )) and uses it to obtain ( 10 , 11 , PCRL V ) = SDec( 4 , SEnc( 8 , ( 10, 11, PCRL V ))). Upon decrypting the data, TA verifies the freshness of the message by comparing the decrypted 10 with the previously generated 10.…”

“…The proposed scheme suggests the usage of PASS [8] as the mechanism for authentication of videos uploaded to the Cloud Platform, not only because it has one of the lowest overheads in terms of time for signing, certificate validation, and signature verification (see Table 2), but also because it solves the limitation of BP [16]. However, other algorithms such as BP [16], ECPP [17], DCS [18], and hybrid one [19] can be considered.…”

“…However, other algorithms such as BP [16], ECPP [17], DCS [18], and hybrid one [19] can be considered. Table 2 shows the time required for generation and verification of signatures and certificate verification using different algorithms [8] (same for both Eiza-Ni-Shi Scheme and proposed scheme). The total overhead generated in video transmission protocol is composed of three elements: (a) video encryption, (b) video transmission, and (c) video decryption by official vehicles.…”