An efficient solution of the resource allotment problem with the Groves–Ledyard mechanism under transferable utility

Multi-agent interaction and nonlinear Markov games

“…Closely related are the questions of the exploitation of limited common resources, often formulated as the fish wars, (see e.g. [175], [176], [154]), project management problems (see e. g. [183]), distribution of investments between economic sectors (see [219]) and general control of crowd behavior and the information propagation through the crowds (see [26], [53] and references therein). Our approach to optimal allocation, taken from [140], deals with the distribution of the efforts of the principal for better management of mean-field interacting particle systems and is also close in spirit to [188].…”

A Markovian Mechanism of Proportional Resource Allocation in the Incentive Model as a Dynamic Stochastic Inverse Stackelberg Game

“…Resource allocation mechanisms in the static setup are studied in contract theory [4] and also in control of organizational systems [5]. Here, the main concern of the investigators is to design strategy-proof mechanisms [6,7]. More specifically, by assumption, the Principal does not know the exact characteristics of the agents and the latter can use this fact for strategic manipulation (information distortion for their own benefit), see [8].…”