An elementary proposition concerning parallel imports

Pricing and Welfare Implications of Parallel Imports in the Pharmaceutical Industry

“…This does not mean that permitting parallel trade results in global uniform pricing. Contrary to other papers (Malueg and Schwartz, 1994;Richardson, 2002) in which parallel imports are assumed to imply de facto global uniform pricing, we obtain global uniform pricing only if consumers value the original drug and the parallel imported drug equally. However, as noted by , goods that are parallel imported may not be perceived to be of the same quality between markets, even if the manufacturer placed them on the market originally, because of differences in packaging or guarantees.…”

“…This additional step is left for further research. In that sense, it is worth acknowledging the contribution of Richardson (2002) who demonstrates that, when countries individually choose whether or not to prohibit parallel imports, a global Nash equilibrium involves the permitting of parallel importing into all relevant foreign markets.…”

Profit-Enhancing Parallel Imports

“…Japan, for example, has followed a more open policy with respect to parallel imports in trademarked goods than has the United States, and a decision by Japan's Supreme Court with respect to parallel imports in patented products is pending. For a discussion on parallel imports, see also Richardson (2002). 2 See, e.g., the above discussion in Abbott (1998).…”

Prohibition of parallel imports as a vertical restraint: per se approach or a misunderstanding?

“…59 Jelovac and Bordoy (2005) depict that whether only consumer willingness to pay differs and health systems are the same across countries, the permission of parallel imports will enhance total welfare. Richardson (2002) implies that it is a global Nash equilibrium to permit parallel trade. The author concludes that lobbying by international producers and tariffs are possible sources of price discrimination around the globe.…”