An empirical analysis of litigation with discovery: The role of fairness

Pecorino, Paul; Boening, Mark Van

doi:10.1016/j.socec.2019.06.009

Cited by 9 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…The ex ante probability that Player A's type is A H equals p. Each party bears their own costs at trial, C A and C B , respectively. The game proceeds as follows: Pecorino and Van Boening (2019a) analyzes costly voluntary disclosures in a signaling game, whereas Pecorino and Van Boening (2019b) analyzes a costly discovery procedure. Solomon (2022) considers how role switching (between the plaintiff and defendant roles) may facilitate learning within the signaling model of litigation.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Sullivan (2016) is an experimental test of the Spier (1992) model in which there are multiple bargaining periods. Previous experimental work on the signaling model includes Pecorino and Van Boening (2018, 2019a, 2019b) and Solomon (2022). While these authors find some anomalous behavior, the experimental results are broadly in line with the predictions of theory.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Litigation with negative expected value suits: An experimental analysis

Deck,

Pecorino,

Solomon

2024

J Empirical Legal Studies

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The existence of lawsuits providing plaintiffs a negative expected value (NEV) at trial has important theoretical implications for signaling models of litigation. The signaling equilibrium possible when there are no NEV suits breaks down because plaintiffs with NEV suits do not have a credible threat to proceed to trial, which undermines the ability to signal type. Using a laboratory experiment, we analyze behavior with and without the possibility of NEV suits. Absent NEV suits, behavior largely follows predicted patterns. However, the possibility of NEV suits is not found to cause the signaling equilibrium to unravel or to cause the dispute rate to increase. Plaintiffs only drop NEV lawsuits three‐fourths of the time, the rejection rate by defendants for revealing demands rises less than predicted and, contra theory, the rejection rate on demands in the semi‐pooling range remains unchanged.

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Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%