2012
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1969605
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An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress

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Cited by 14 publications
(15 citation statements)
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“…Mendoza, Beja, Barua, and Venida (, p. 132) also categorize the negative effects of political dynasties in the Philippines in terms of three mechanisms. First, it prohibits citizens from voicing their demands, needs, and expectations to politicians because a hierarchical culture is manifested that promotes a culture of deference.…”
Section: The Effect Of Political Dynasties On Public Goods Provisionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Mendoza, Beja, Barua, and Venida (, p. 132) also categorize the negative effects of political dynasties in the Philippines in terms of three mechanisms. First, it prohibits citizens from voicing their demands, needs, and expectations to politicians because a hierarchical culture is manifested that promotes a culture of deference.…”
Section: The Effect Of Political Dynasties On Public Goods Provisionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The notion that corruption emanates from the client‐patron relationships espoused by political dynasties in Congress finds empirical validation from the seminal work of Mendoza and colleagues (). In their analysis of the 15th Congress of the Philippines, they find evidence that, ceteris paribus, dynastic clans possess a higher net worth (net income) than nondynastic families in Congress, and they also benefit from winning elections by larger margins than those belonging to nondynastic families.…”
Section: The Effect Of Political Dynasties On Public Goods Provisionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Moreover, the role of political dynasties is more apparent in some countries, such as in Japan, where during 1970-2000 two-thirds of all of the Members of the Lower House were from political families (Asako et al, 2012;Ishibashi & Reed, 1992;Taniguchi, 2008). In the Mexican Parliament, the ratio was around 20-40 per cent (Camp, 1982;1995), nearly the same as in the Parliament of India (French, 2011) and the Congress of the Philippines 3 (Mendoza et al, 2012;Querubin, 2011).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 76%
“…A more appropriate explanation for this phenomenon is that due to the high popularity of Thaksin and the TRT, many key political families that were pro-Thaksin were able to capitalise on both the strength of the TRT's policies and their own political influence to win the election, whereas many other families that refused to cooperate with the TRT faced difficulties. Thus, as part of the overall shift in the electorate toward Thaksin, the increasing (Rossi, 2009); india (French, 2011); Japan and Mexico (Asako et al, 2010); the Philippines (Mendoza et al, 2012) 18 ; thailand (calculated by the author) respectively (Figure 2), contrary to initial claims by the media and the intelligentsia 17 that party dissolution would lead to the extinction of political dynasties. In fact, many banned politicians used their relatives to run on their behalf in the 2007 and 2011 elections.…”
Section: Changes In the Political Dynasties In The House Of Representmentioning
confidence: 96%