An Empirical Assessment of the 2004 EU Merger Policy Reform

Duso, Tomaso; Gugler, Klaus; Szücs, Florian

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1721412

Cited by 24 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 33 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The basic insight behind this categorization of mergers is that transactions which enhance collusion (or market-power) will increase the underlining value and profitability of competitor firms on average, while mergers which enhance efficiencies (or true synergies) will decrease the underlining value and profitability of competitor firms on average (Duso et al, 2007(Duso et al, , 2011(Duso et al, , 2013.…”

Section: Empirical Demonstrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Correcting for Self-Selection Based Endogeneity in Management Research: A Review and Empirical Demonstration

Clougherty

Duso

2015

SSRN Journal

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractFoundational to the discipline of management is the idea that organizational decisions are a function of expected outcomes; hence, the customary empirical approach to employ multivariate techniques that regress performance outcome variables on discrete measures of organizational choices (e.g., investments, trainings, strategies and other managerial decision variables) potentially suffer from self-selection based endogeneity bias. Selectioneffects represent an internal validity threat as they can lead to biased parameters that render erroneous empirical results and incorrect conclusions with regard to the veracity of theoretical assertions. Our review of the empirical literature suggests that the issue of selection-effects has received increasing attention in management; yet, the techniques to correct for selection-effects have not always been employed in the proper manner, thus estimations often suffer from design shortcomings that potentially render flawed empirical findings. We explain the nature of self-selection based endogeneity bias and review the techniques available to researchers in management to correct for selection-effects when organizational decisions are discrete in nature. Employing data on M&A investment decisions and rival-firm value reactions, we provide empirical examples that demonstrate the tradeoffs involved with the alternative techniques.

show abstract

Section: Empirical Demonstrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With these measures at hand, we follow Duso et al (2007Duso et al ( , 2011Duso et al ( , 2013 in operationalizing our merger typology.…”

Section: Mcwilliams and Siegel 1997)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Correcting for Self-Selection Based Endogeneity in Management Research: A Review and Empirical Demonstration

Clougherty

Duso

2015

SSRN Journal

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The introduction of the new EC merger regulation in 2004 (see Section 3 below for further information) was not only accompanied by an intensive general discussion by both lawyers and economists, particularly on how it is best applied in practice (see, e.g., Christiansen (2006), De la Mano and Röller (2006) or Monti (2008)) but led to several econometric studies evaluating specific impacts of the reform (see, e.g., Duso et al (2013), Martinez Fernandez et al (2008), Andreasson and Sundqvist (2008) or Mai (2014)). For example, Duso et al (2013) develop a general framework to assess merger policy effectiveness and then apply the framework as part of an event study to four different dimensions of effectiveness.…”

Section: Review Of Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, Duso et al (2013) develop a general framework to assess merger policy effectiveness and then apply the framework as part of an event study to four different dimensions of effectiveness. After comparing the respective results before and after the merger policy reform, they conclude that the reform seems to have been a rather modest improvement of European merger policy.…”

Section: Review Of Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Duration of the EC Merger Control Process: Determinants and the Impact of the 2004 Merger Regulation Reform

2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. THE DURATION OF THE EC MERGER CONTROL PROCESS AbstractThe duration of merger proceedings held by competition authorities is an important determinant of the efficiency of the entire merger control process. We use a dataset of 2953 Phase I and 92 Phase II investigations completed by the European Commission (EC) between 1999 and 2008 to examine the key determinants of their duration. Differentiating between authority-and caserelated drivers, we find that while the duration of Phase I investigations largely depends on the type of decision and use of simplified procedure, the duration of Phase II investigations is driven by factors such as industry knowledge, the duration of the preceding Phase I investigation, the origin of the notifying firm or the number of identified relevant markets. We also provide evidence that the significant increase in average duration identified after the 2004 merger regulation reform does not imply a decrease in administrative efficiency, as the probability of indepth investigations was correspondingly reduced.

show abstract

“…We specify the underlying mechanism formally with respect to merger control. 6 The increasing use of remedies has also triggered empirical research concerning the e¤ectiveness of merger control in general (see Duso et al, 2011, and Duso et al, 2013, for the EU and Clougerthy and Seldeslachts, 2012, for the US).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control

Dertwinkel-Kalt

Wey

2014

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe investigate how remedies in merger control a¤ect information acquisition by an antitrust agency. We identify conditions under which an "extreme options" regime which does not allow for remedies improves information acquisition by the agency which increases consumer surplus. The legislator ("principal") and the agency share the same objective function with the only exception that the latter must bear information costs. When remedies are not feasible, then the agency's incentive to acquire information is relatively large as a false decision tends to have large adverse e¤ects. When remedies are feasible, the intermediate option does not involve such risks, so that incentives to acquire information decreases. However, our results depend crucially on the institutional environment. In the case of an adversial system, information acquisition incentives are not per se lower if remedies are feasible.We thank Lars Sorgard and Deszö Szalay for their helpful comments.

show abstract

An Empirical Assessment of the 2004 EU Merger Policy Reform

Cited by 24 publications

References 33 publications

Correcting for Self-Selection Based Endogeneity in Management Research: A Review and Empirical Demonstration

Correcting for Self-Selection Based Endogeneity in Management Research: A Review and Empirical Demonstration

The Duration of the EC Merger Control Process: Determinants and the Impact of the 2004 Merger Regulation Reform

Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About