An empirical examination of transaction‐ and firm‐level influences on the vertical boundaries of the firm

Abstract

A large literature has successfully employed transaction cost economic theory to describe how exchange conditions affect the optimal form of organization. However, this approach has historically not accounted for the influence of firm‐specific attributes on the governance decision. This paper develops a model based on insights from transaction cost economics, the resource‐based view, and real options theory to examine how transaction‐level characteristics, firm‐specific capabilities, and product‐market scope influence the governance of production. Empirical evidence derived from analysis of 469 make‐or‐buy decisions involving 117 semiconductor firms indicates that decisions regarding the governance of production activities are strongly influenced by both transaction‐ and firm‐level effects. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The role of incentives and communication in strategic alliances: an experimental investigation

“…Mutual economic incentive alignment was ensured, as exemplified by the following quotes from Treece et al (1992: 102-107 However, much of the article describes why this underlying economic alignment was not sufficient in itself. The communication efforts undertaken by both corporations to ensure coordination, relationship management, expectations conformation, and even camaraderie development are illustrated by the following quotes from Treece et al (1992: 102-107 In highlighting the above mechanisms, we also contribute to scholarly work that has built on Williamson's (1975) seminal work, aside from the rich transactions costs insights regarding the role 430 R. Agarwal, R. Croson, and J. T. Mahoney of opportunistic behavior, uncertainty, asset specificity, and their interactions in determining the governance form choice among feasible alternatives (Leiblein and Miller, 2003;Villalonga and McGahan 2005). Williamson (1975) also identified other factors that are critical determinants of success, which our study highlights.…”

A multi-level investigation of information technology outsourcing

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“…Fluctuation in volume makes externalization more attractive, since a firm will not want to own excess assets. Leiblein and Miller (2003) found that demand uncertainty increased the reliance on outsourcing. When assessing IT outsourcing, it is important to consider the proximity of IT activities with the core capabilities of the firm.…”

Capacidad Transaccional: Evidencias Del Sistema Financiero Peruano

“…Por el lado teórico, por ejemplo, aún existe escasa literatura sobre la definición de esta capacidad, con excepciones, como los trabajos de Loasby (2002) y Tello-Gamarra y Zawislak (2013). Mientras que, por el lado empírico, son pocos los trabajos (Argyres & Mayer, 2007;Leiblein & Miller, 2003) que buscan evidencias sobre la capacidad transaccional y, cuando lo hacen, estas investigaciones comúnmente se enfocan en firmas de actividades manufactureras (industriales), descuidando un sector significativo de la economía como el sector de servicios.…”