An empirical implication of Auspitz-Lieben-Edgeworth-Pareto complementarity

Chipman, John S.

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90096-5

Cited by 51 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…uðy þ hÞ À uðyÞ for all x; y 2 R ' þ such that x y, and for all h 2 R ' þ . When u is twice continuously differentiable on R ' þ , then u has non-increasing increments if and only if u 00 jk 0 8j; k 2 L, a condition known under the label of ALEP substitutability 2 (see Chipman 1977). When a person gets richer, marginal utility is required to decrease in each dimension.…”

Section: Increasing Additive and Concavegmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian

Fleurbaey

Trannoy

2003

Social Choice and Welfare

100

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Abstract. In a one-good world, there is a nice correspondence between the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfer and social welfare dominance. In this paper we study the case of multiple goods (without using prices as a means to come back to one dimension), and show that many results of the onedimensional setting carry over to the multidimensional case when individuals are assumed to have identical preferences. But the nice correspondence breaks down as soon as individual preferences display minimal differences, and multidimensional versions of the transfer principle clash with the Pareto principle. This analysis reveals an interesting connection with the theory of fair allocation, since multidimensional transfer principles are closely related to the no-domination criterion, a weak version of the no-envy criterion. IntroductionAmong the many issues to which Louis Gevers has contributed, comes to mind the construction of social rankings in economic environments and more precisely in the Edgeworth box (Gevers 1986). The social choice problem has more structure when one takes account of the scarcity of resources and some basic features of individual preferences like monotonicity and convexity.

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Section: Increasing Additive and Concavegmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian

Fleurbaey

Trannoy

2003

Social Choice and Welfare

100

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“…It shows that commitments magnify risk 1 1 Such a W exists because A2 ensures that x n (W ) is increasing [Chipman 1977], x n (W ) is continuous, x n (0) = 0, and by A1 x n (W ) ! 1 as W !…”

Section: Iic Risk Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consumption Commitments and Risk Preferences

Chetty¹,

Szeidl²

2006

108

133

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“…The result is identical to Chipman (1977). The proof there is very similar to ours, but does not proceed from a general approach to comparative statics: it uses properties of the indirect utility function instead of treating Lagrange multipliers as part of an enlarged system of equations.…”

Section: Proposition 6 (Normal Goods) If G Is Strongly Concave Supermentioning

confidence: 55%

“…3 and give two illustrations of GMA with constraints. The first recovers Chipman's (1977) normal-good theorem for supermodular, strongly concave utility functions (Sect. 4.1).…”

Section: Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 72%

Generalized monotonicity analysis

Strulovici

Weber

2009

Econ Theory

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Complex economic models often lack the structure for the application of standard techniques in monotone comparative statics. Generalized monotonicity analysis (GMA) extends the available methods in several directions. First, it provides a way of finding parameter moves that yield monotonicity of model solutions. Second, it allows studying the monotonicity of functions or subsets of variables. Third, GMA naturally provides bounds on the sensitivity of variables to parameter changes. Fourth, GMA may be used to derive conditions under which monotonicity obtains with respect to functions of parameters, corresponding to imposed parameter moves. Fifth, GMA contributes insights into the theory of comparative statics, for example, with respect to dealing with constraints or exploiting additional information about the model structure. Several applications of GMA are presented, including constrained optimization, nonsupermodular games, aggregation, robust inference, and monotone comparative dynamics.

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An empirical implication of Auspitz-Lieben-Edgeworth-Pareto complementarity

Cited by 51 publications

References 8 publications

The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian

The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian

Consumption Commitments and Risk Preferences

Generalized monotonicity analysis

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