1999
DOI: 10.2307/3152090
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An Empirical Investigation of Ex Post Transaction Costs in Franchised Distribution Channels

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Cited by 167 publications
(92 citation statements)
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“…The measures used this study that support the inter-organisational RM and transaction cost model (see Figure 1) are based upon the following sources: causes a trust -items were adapted from Zaheer et al (1998) b commitment -items were adapted from Morgan and Hunt (1994) and Anderson and Weitz (1992) mediator satisfaction -items were adapted from Andaleeb (1996) outcomes specific investments -items were adapted from Heide and John (1990) opportunism -items were adapted from Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999), John (1984) and Provan and Skinner (1989) formalisation -items were adapted from Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999).…”
Section: Measures and Scale Itemsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The measures used this study that support the inter-organisational RM and transaction cost model (see Figure 1) are based upon the following sources: causes a trust -items were adapted from Zaheer et al (1998) b commitment -items were adapted from Morgan and Hunt (1994) and Anderson and Weitz (1992) mediator satisfaction -items were adapted from Andaleeb (1996) outcomes specific investments -items were adapted from Heide and John (1990) opportunism -items were adapted from Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999), John (1984) and Provan and Skinner (1989) formalisation -items were adapted from Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999).…”
Section: Measures and Scale Itemsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A number of researchers have investigated these dimensions as part of a higher order construct, relationship quality, in B2B as well as business to consumer (B2C) situations (Dorsch et al, 1998;Hennig-Thurau and Klee, 1997;Hewett et al, 2002;Roberts et al, 2003;Shamdasani and Balakrishnan, 2000;Svensson et al, 2009;Walter et al, 2003;Wong and Sohal, 2002). In a number of studies, trust and commitment are presented as independent concepts (Hewett et al, 2002;Morgan and Hunt, 1994;Ruyter et al, 2001).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The profits created by investment are generally seized by the opportunist. In order to solve such a problem, the cost of negotiation is reduced and opportunism is avoided if cooperation and mutual interest are taken into account in the contract with the franchise (Dahlstrom, Nygaard 1999b). In law and political economics, the so-called hold-up problem results from the re-bargaining afterward demanded by the one party.…”
Section: Reviewing the Documents Relevant To Taiwan High-speed Rail Pmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Agency theorists have long argued that there are often divergent interests between principals (franchisors) and agents (franchisees) and that franchisees may behave opportunistically to pursue their own interests at the expense of those of the franchisor (Brickley and Dark, 1987;Lafontaine, 1992;Elango and Fried, 1997;Dant and Nasr, 1998;Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999;Quinn and Doherty, 2000). Maintaining a tightly controlled and integrated system that supports a defined brand name and image is deemed essential to gain competitive advantage in any type of franchise system (Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996).…”
Section: Control In Franchise Agreementsmentioning
confidence: 99%